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Abstract: Intuition is the ability to understand immediately without conscious reasoning and 
is sometimes explained as a ‘gut feeling’ about the rightness or wrongness of a person, place, 
situation, temporal episode or object. In contrast, insight is the capacity to gain accurate and 
a deep understanding of a problem and it is often associated with movement beyond existing 
paradigms. Examples include Darwin, Einstein and Freud’s theories of natural selection, relativ-
ity, or the unconscious; respectively. Many cultures name these concepts and acknowledge their 
value, and insight is recognized as particularly characteristic of eminent achievements in the 
arts, sciences and politics. Considerable data suggests that these two concepts are more related 
than distinct, and that a more distributed intuitive network may feed into a predominately right 
hemispheric insight-based functional neuronal architecture. The preparation and incubation 
stages of insight may rely on the incorporation of domain-specific automatized expertise schema 
associated with intuition. In this manuscript the neural networks associated with intuition and 
insight are reviewed. Case studies of anomalous subjects with ability–achievement discrepan-
cies are summarized. This theoretical review proposes the prospect that atypical localization of 
cognitive modules may enhance intuitive and insightful functions and thereby explain individual 
achievement beyond that expected by conventionally measured intelligence tests. A model and 
theory of intuition and insight’s neuroanatomical basis is proposed which could be used as a 
starting point for future research and better understanding of the nature of these two distinctly 
human and highly complex poorly understood abilities.
Keywords: intuition, insight, nonverbal decoding, nonverbal sequencing, unconscious and 
conscious processes, right hemisphere dominance, atypical localization of cognitive functions, 
crossed aphasia, inverse cognitive modeling, emergent properties, anomalous functions, spe-
cialization, visual gesture lexicon, crosslinguistic fluency, achievement–ability discrepancy, IQ 
threshold theory, functional capacity, House–Tree–Person, drawings, clinical intuition, clinical 
psychology
“It’s not that I’m so smart, it’s just that I stay with problems longer”
—Albert Einstein
“The right hemisphere lacks the capacity to generate productive language in over 95% 
of the population…[therefore most research]…focused on the language capabilities 
of this ‘typical’ right hemisphere… (p. 132).”1 This comment centred on studies of the 
‘typical’ right hemisphere in the majority of subjects’ for whom the left hemisphere 
is language dominant. Right hemisphere language functions were revealed by: com-
missurotomy, epilepsy lesion resection, hemispherectomy, stroke or in cases of brain 
injury. This review also listed right hemisphere-dependent processes which parallel Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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left hemisphere-dependent language processes. To name 
a few would include: visual word recognition, pre-lexical 
influences on encoding, phonology, orthography, imageabil-
ity, syntax and semantics, deep dyslexia and letter-by-letter 
reading.2 However as with most research before it on this 
topic all patients were previously severely neurologically 
compromised. Hence it would be erroneous and inappropriate 
to use these defective populations for the study of advanced 
putative right hemisphere cognitive processing modules 
or ‘traits’. This would be all the more true for those right 
hemisphere cognitive functions operating at the upper level 
of complexity responsible for instantiating neurally complex 
human social interaction and communication. This fact is 
due to the ostensibly deleterious effects of any neurological 
lesion on higher cortical functions.3 The contrary and still 
widely held neurolinguistic doctrine on right hemisphere 
language functions is that the dominant left hemisphere alone 
demonstrates an intrinsic superiority at linguistic mediation.4 
However again many of these old neurolinguistic assumptions 
consisted of arguments, studies, and theory that were based 
solely on inherently pathological cases and without the benefit 
of modern functional neuroimaging technologies.
To advance a more specific hypothesis: Are endogenous 
differences to be found in atypical right hemisphere local-
ized subjects where strong hemispheric dominance exists 
that is not complicated by mixed dominance or pre-existing 
pathology? Strongly atypically localized and unilateral right 
hemisphere language dominant subjects are the main focus 
of this article (eg, see Floel and colleagues).5 The hypothesis 
here is that the co-association of language along with other 
novel module combinations to the nondominant hemisphere 
may precipitate development of emergent higher-order cog-
nitive functions. The hypothesis is based on a dozen case 
reports of strongly right-hemisphere lateralized subjects with 
average general ability scores and yet with superior indices 
of achievement.5–8 A large achievement and aptitude test 
difference implies that some other ability may be mediating 
the usually strong correlation of achievement and ability test 
concordance. Modern functional neuroimaging studies are 
becoming available which are not confounded by the problem 
of pre-existing lesions or neuropathology.
Some new structural neuroimaging studies such as dif-
fusion tensor imaging (DTI) are being carried out that allow 
researchers to examine why a specific neural tract might be 
expected to divert along a specific neural trajectory onto-
genetically and developmentally. These studies may go far 
in explaining how a specific neural functional architecture 
could support exceptional instances of intuitive acumen 
and/or insight in problem solving. For instance, recent DTI 
studies show that a “ventral semantic stream” consisting of 
the fast conducting inferior occipitofrontal fasciculus fibers 
links the occipitotemporal and orbital regions within the 
dominant hemisphere. This newly discovered tract may play 
a key role in multiple concept semantic mapping9 that has 
been posited in extensive reviews of the right hemisphere’s 
parsing of complex discourse functions.10 Incidentally, as 
we will see this neural tract also possesses spatiotemporal 
properties that could function as a conduit linking intuition 
and insight. Complex discourse functions might include 
for instance mapping the common threads of discussion 
between articles appearing in a newspaper over the course 
of a week of publications. Such architectures might be able 
to synchronize widespread schemas within the cortex and 
provide a type of “semantic gestalt” along the lines of how 
perceptual gestalts are put together in the posterior sensory 
processing cortices.11
The theory of co-localization and emergent cogni-
tive functions was previously hypothesized by Basso and 
colleagues.12 Co-localization suggests that unique com-
binations and permutations of modules may reside in one 
hemisphere or another or even perhaps in the anterior or 
posterior components within a hemisphere. Emergent 
properties suggest cognitive processes that are qualitatively 
different from each other, either in terms of structure and/or 
function. Complete reversibility in the lateralization of cog-
nitive functions has been previously reported. It is however, 
quite rare13 and has yet to be studied systematically with 
functional and structural neuroimaging or even using in depth 
neuropsychological assessment and longitudinal achievement 
studies. There are almost no published studies of atypical 
right hemisphere language dominants subjects where com-
prehensive neuropsychological assessments were carried 
out in conjunction with in depth structural and functional 
neuroimaging studies.
Given the inherent level of complexity in cognitive 
modules that are based within an entire hemisphere 
(or that are the product of whole brain volume oscillation 
of synchronized signals), comprehensive neuropsycho-
logical single case studies and field studies of the social 
aspects of these phenomenon would be most appropriate.14 
Comprehensive cataloguing of single-case studies of 
such phenomenon in atypical subjects are nonexistent. 
Participant–observation studies of such putative advanced 
social signaling communicative abilities in atypically 
localized subjects cannot be found in the published litera-
ture. In addition to the academic and practical implications Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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of atypical localization for cognitive neuropsychology there 
are profound theoretical implications for neurolinguistics 
and theories of language ontogeny in humans. Atypical 
localization cases or unique co-localization scenarios can 
be instructive in understanding the fundamental and deep 
principles by which the cerebral cortex is organized, with 
respect to language in association with other major neuro-
cognitive functions.15 Basso and colleagues was among the 
first to note the fruitfulness of such questioning.12
Hence, given the above, no theory about the organization 
of language or cognitive function can be considered com-
prehensive and/or “complete” without inclusion of a theory 
that accounts for the “anomalies”. Indeed the single case in 
neuropsychology is enough by itself to tell experimenters and 
researchers what the human brain is capable of (or not capable 
of for that matter!) as well as providing for the basis for gener-
alizations to the population as a whole.16 A full accounting of 
how these atypical and anomalous cases of right hemisphere 
language arise should illuminate the genetic, evolutionary, 
and functional aspects of these complex, rare and emergent 
properties. A complete accounting of such anomalies in any 
comprehensive cognitive neuroscience of language should 
help to establish the upper limit parameters on what consti-
tutes language by nature as well as the natural constraints 
placed on the development of such linguistic processes. Such 
studies could be instructive on how normal language evolved 
and for what purposes language evolved in the first place in 
ancestral human beings.
From a more mechanistic point of view, Fischer and 
colleagues specifically enquired how different cognitive 
and behavioral operations might be related to each other in 
terms of functional outcome.13 That is, is it possible that the 
intrinsic characteristics or cognitive functions of unexpect-
edly displaced modules transforms as a function of either (i) 
dislocation, or (ii) co-localization, along with other modules, 
within an unexpected hemisphere? Is it true that atypical-
ity and anomalous language representation and unique 
co-localization of other cognitive functions can result in a 
functional configuration of neural networks that is favorable 
to the exceptional development of higher-order cognitive 
functions such as intuition and insight? Can completely 
unique cognitive or sociocognitive abilities arise develop-
mentally in such anomalous individuals? How would any 
such rare and new abilities that are sparingly distributed (or 
patently not even present), in the general population relate 
structurally and functionally to other abilities such general 
intelligence or spatial abilities? It is hypothesized that 
right-ward language localization and unique co-localization 
configurations are unique and that such cases can illustrate 
fundamental principles of language organization even in 
the normal brain.
Organization of this review
In this extensive theoretical overview of the putative higher-
order functions instantiated in part by the right hemisphere 
a diverse selection of cognitive psychological, neurological, 
neuroradiological, and neuropsychological literature and 
data will be examined. Initially we will undertake to define 
intuition and insight in practical, historical and experimental 
terms. Secondly we will show how intuition and insight are 
intrinsically nested within social-cultural constructs of soci-
ety and to notions of collective mind. Thirdly we will show 
how intuition and insight constructs are related to each other 
through empirical studies in the cognitive sciences. Fourthly, 
we will show how nonverbal decoding efficacy appears to be 
a central construct in understanding intuition as a function 
of cognitive psychological expertise.
As we will see conscious and unconscious processes and 
their integration with emotional evaluation will be central to 
understanding the link between intuition and insight. Focus-
ing almost entirely on contemporary functional neuroimaging 
studies (eg, functional magnetic resonance imaging [fMRI], 
position emission tomography [PET] and magnetoencepha-
lography [MEG]) we will discuss the neural correlates of 
intuition first which may have a more bilateral representation. 
Then we will discuss the largely right hemispheric networks 
underlying insight using many of the same techniques. This 
two-component network likely figures prominently in virtually 
all complex novel social problem-solving and thus would likely 
confer selective adaptive survival value. We will then endeavor 
to briefly summarize how the self may be a central concept 
mediating between unconscious and conscious mind; and hence 
between intuition and insight. Carl Jung conceived of the self as 
representing the quest for unity and integration in personality 
and he held that the self as a concept was not yet mature until 
the third decade of life.18 In Jung’s 1928 theory the “self ” was 
a midpoint between the conscious and unconscious minds.19
With this conceptual overview of how conscious and 
unconscious processes are interrelated we can then focus on 
the interesting case of how reversed linguistic asymmetry can 
shed light on many theoretical neurolinguistic assumptions 
and hypothesized concepts. There is indeed good evidence 
that a right ventral hemispheric network operates in both 
intuition and insight mediated in part perhaps by lateralized 
caudate nucleus and orbitofrontal networks. In the third part 
of the review we undertake to show how crossed aphasia Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
McCrea Dovepress
submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
Dovepress 
was the initial impetus for all early conceptualizations of the 
functions of the right hemisphere. For many contemporary 
reasons it can be shown that this standard view of the 
neurolinguistic inferiority of the right hemisphere is now 
doubtful and should be viewed with scepticism. Praxis later-
alization (either in oppositional hemispheres or co-localized 
within the right hemisphere with language in atypicals) 
is discussed as an effect perhaps mediated by the posited 
“right shift” gene. Such a gene might have enabled language 
production and comprehension for group communication 
simultaneous with superior unimanual praxis in ancestral 
conditions.
A hypothetical line of argumentation shows that 
atypicality may confer adaptive traits and those anomalous 
patterns of resting state functional lateralization of 
intuition and insight could be readily explained. A set 
of subjects with strong rightward language lateralization 
that demonstrate characteristic intelligence quotient (IQ)-
achievement discrepancies are suggested to be examples 
of individuals with enhanced or heightened intuitive and 
insightful processing functions. Although this set of atypi-
cal subjects is a small sample that has not been extensively 
evaluated, in the context of the other lines of converging 
evidence the summary results are provocative. The review 
ends with a practical discussion for future research studies 
on this neglected topic. In the first instance extreme indi-
vidual differences in these sociocognitive functions may 
necessarily exist with some rather interesting implications. 
In the second instance there may not only be quantitative 
differences in performance of such real-world intuitive and 
insightful sociocognitive functions – but due also to emer-
gent properties – there may be qualitative differences in the 
functional neural architecture associated with anomalous 
or atypical subjects. It is also shown how these sociocogni-
tive functions may be currently poorly understood because 
of the necessity of studying them in interaction within the 
larger sociocultural milieu as in participant-observation or 
field studies. This is a highly complex quasi-experimental 
approach fraught with inherent measurement difficulties 
as well as concept operationalization problems. There 
are also more cognitive neuropsychological implications 
for understanding gender differences, the nature of intel-
ligence, and the proper psychometric assessment of these 
putative higher-order abilities as well as understanding 
the functioning of mixed cortical and subcortically-based 
neural networks. Finally a clinically relevant and practical 
example of intuitive-insight based acumen from clinical 
psychology is put forward with an associated specific set 
of testable assumptions and hypotheses for future research 
in this area.
Definition of intuition and insight
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, insight is “… the 
capacity to gain an accurate and deep intuitive understand-
ing of something...”20 Gestalt psychologist and theoretical 
linguist, Karl Bühler, originally coined the term insight and 
here it is conceived of as an individual differences variable 
that people may possess in varying quantities.21 In contrast 
to intuition, insight involves a period of incubation of the 
problem before the recognition of a solution.22 There is usu-
ally the emergence of a specific temporal pattern associated 
with the solution to the problem as the solution becomes 
more and more conscious23 culminating in the ‘aha or eureka 
moment’.24 Intuition, in contrast, has been described by 
Knoblich as “…the ability to understand something imme-
diately, without the need for conscious reasoning...” There 
are key differences between intuition and insight. Intuition 
occurs instantly and is emotionally laden; it does not have 
the accompanying verbal, conscious declarative awareness 
of the final stage of insight.25 Interestingly, from the point 
of view of the cognitive and neural systems supporting the 
two higher-order processes, is the finding that intuition often 
precedes an actual conscious insight.26 This stage-like aspect 
of intuition and insight as conceived of in this theoretical 
review will be elaborated on in subsequent sections. Bechara 
and Damasio similarly described intuition as a holistic hunch, 
“a gut feeling” or a sense of absolute certainty or awareness 
that a perception is on the edge of awareness.27 Insight and 
intuition are variables that should have a normal distribution 
within the general population.
Finally, a social cognitive neuroscience perspective of 
intuition has been found incompatible with the self-report of 
intuitive “cognitive style” exemplified by the Myers–Briggs 
type indicator (MBTI).28 In their review of empirical stud-
ies focused on the concept of intuition, Hodgkinson and 
colleagues29 noted that none of the sensing-intuition scale 
items of the MTBI assessed affective or behavioral aspects 
of the concept, as recently defined by social cognitive 
neuroscientists.30 Moreover, Hodgkinson and Clarke found 
that the constructs on which the MTBI are based are theo-
retically incompatible with Carl Jung’s theory and suggest 
behavioral predictions which are contrary to central tenets 
of the theory.31 This raises questions about its suitability 
for the assessment of intuition psychometrically and in 
particularly the construct validity of the MTBI as a whole. 
Nonetheless in this review Jung’s early writings19 on the Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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structure of the self per se do play a considerable role in 
our agentic construct of intuition and insight. Similarly, 
a major difference then between insight and intuition is the 
degree to which the two related constructs are declarative/
explicit or nondeclarative/implicit. Intuition is by defini-
tion nondeclarative and implicit, whereas insight can be 
declarative and explicit in memory.
Lieberman’s review on intuition makes important 
distinctions between the two terms.30 Thus, intuition differs 
from the ‘eureka moments’ characteristic of insight:
“ ….sudden insight also seems to rely on nonconscious 
processes, but when awareness is derived in insight, it is 
not a judgment, as is usually the case in intuition. Rather, 
insight is a process where one suddenly becomes aware of 
the logical relations between a problem and the answer. 
In the case of intuition, usually there is no insight into 
the logical relations, but simply an impetus, judgement, 
hunch, or behavioural response. That said, intuition is the 
subjective experience of a mostly nonconscious process 
that is fast, a-logical, and inaccessible to consciousness 
that, dependent on exposure to the domain or problem 
space, is capable of accurately extracting probabilistic 
contingencies...( p. 110–111).”30
Bruner32 noted that intuition”...rests on familiarity with 
the domain of knowledge and with its structure…” (p. 57)32 
which is a definition congruent with cognitive psychological 
expertise. Recent work has shown that the ability to intuit is 
acquired through experience and learning within a specific 
domain, and indeed appears to be particularly associated with 
perceptual pattern recognition processes.29 Highly skilled 
intuiters have been found capable of holding many sets of 
patterns pertaining to a domain of knowledge in their imme-
diate memory, along with information about the emotional 
salience of each piece of information.33 Hence, the relation-
ship between intuitive behavior and expert experience within 
a domain of knowledge, is especially germane. For instance, 
a chess master may hold 50,000 chess patterns in long-term 
memory.33 Similarly, as an example, it is hypothesized that 
veteran homicide detectives may have an intrinsic feel for 
the truthfulness of a suspect’s story based on the experience 
of conducting hundreds of previous interviews, and utilizing 
a collection of techniques. Finally, Ericsson and Charness 
noted that, consistent with the intuition and expertise within a 
domain hypothesis, systematic studies reveal that it requires 10 
or more years of experience and dedicated practice with skilled 
apprenticeship, to become a true expert within a specific 
domain of knowledge.34 In this sense intuition and expertise 
both carry with them complex pattern recognition processes, 
with an intrinsic motor component, the routinization of which 
suggests a subcortical basal ganglia loci of action.
Social dimensions of intuition 
and insight
Since intuition and insight both carry with them connotations 
of significant interaction with the sociocultural milieu a brief 
review of current research in this area is advisable. Intuition 
and insight are usually defined in terms of their salience for 
scientific discovery. Unfortunately this perspective is often 
associated with a singular person view of history. This view 
of the origins of intuition and insight fails to encompass the 
importance of specific cognitive functions in activities of daily 
living; especially of a social nature. In other words, from a 
practical and utilitarian point of view, intuition and insight may 
play an essential role in the pragmatic functions of language 
and communication. By pragmatics we mean “…the way that 
language is used and interpreted while taking into consider-
ation the characteristics of the speaker and hearer and the 
effects of contextual and situational variables… (p. 175).”15 
For the detective the way a suspect responds to a line of 
questioning through gesture or prosody can be interpreted to 
mean that they are telling the truth or are lying. As we will 
soon discuss it is such nonverbal decoding of human behavior 
in face-to-face interactions and perhaps at some distance that 
may play a central role in any conceptualization of what these 
abilities are in essence. Interestingly, neuropragmatics or the 
study of how the brain comprehends and produces linguistic 
behavior, shares many similarities with the underlying func-
tional neuroanatomical systems associated with intuition 
and insight.35 Hierarchical discourse processes and unstated 
assumptions; indirect requests; figurative, metaphoric and 
model building language; mentalizing and theory of mind; and 
neurolinguistic right hemisphere functions are all examples 
of a neuropragmatic and intuition–insight link.10
This functional, socially relevant, and practical view of 
insight and intuition is the one that we propose to utilize for 
model-building and hypotheses generation in social cognitive 
neuroscience.29 In their reviews Hodgkinson and colleagues 
as well as Lieberman note that intuition and insight offer 
considerable explanatory power as essential bridging con-
structs in social cognitive neuroscience.29,30 Intuition and 
insight seem to be able to bridge the individual psychology 
of the thinking variables (eg, cognitive science) with the more 
contextualized nature of social psychology. In this view, the 
fundamentally social elements of intuition and insight are 
inseparable from concise definitions of the two terms and 
their theoretical interrelations. As such they are more truly Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
McCrea Dovepress
submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
Dovepress 
conceptualized as social rather than cognitive psychological 
processes. Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer note that many 
cultures have words for such concepts as insight, which are 
by nature exceptional and highly valued within a culture.36 
Moreover, these authors note that basic stages are associated 
with insight. In the first stage, an insight is associated with a 
state of mind relevant to a particular topic, or to knowledge 
which may be known as a developed domain of expertise. 
Secondly, a moment of realization results as a consequence of 
the acquisition of new information specific to the knowledge 
domain. Finally, a quick re-structuring of the model (as in the 
example of a “semantic gestalt” where the picture fits with 
many lines of different evidence), is subjectively experienced 
as new understanding.
When Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer interviewed objec-
tively determined exceptionally creative women and men 
(eg, Nobel Prize winners), a characteristic four stage narra-
tive model of interactional factors emerged.36 The first stage 
consisted of laborious reading and research preceding the 
insight. The second stage was a period of idle time usually 
spent alone, with the critical third stage of the insight occur-
ring almost momentarily. Finally, the fourth stage consisted 
of the work-intensive fleshing out of ideas, and painstaking 
elaboration in order to bring the idea to fruition. Hence for 
these authors the ‘hard work’ that actually precedes insight 
in scientific and artistic endeavors is usually deeply rooted in 
interaction with colleagues, and the individual’s internalized 
understanding of a culturally constituted domain. However 
from a more practical point of view, it is generally accepted 
that some individuals develop more expertise in social 
understanding and socially productive behavior than others. 
That is, do some people differ, in a manner similar to an 
individual difference variable, in the amount of raw intuition 
and insight that they possess in understanding other people? 
If so, by what emotional, cognitive, and neuropsychological 
mechanisms could fundamentally socially based raw intuition 
and insight develop?
In their interviews, Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer found 
that creative individuals displayed strong subjective aware-
ness of external social or disciplinary influences with refer-
ence to (i) interpersonal contact (ii) strategic considerations, 
and (iii) awareness of the relevant paradigms.36 Furthermore 
they possessed an awareness of the central questions occu-
pying the consciousness of the field, a keen appreciation for 
the zeitgeist or “spirit of the times”. An additional creative 
process set of variables uncovered through the interviews 
was an iterative loop recurring from the individual person 
(constituting evolutionary pattern of variation) to selection 
(the field in which the person works) to retention (or the 
cumulative record), consisting of a communicable symbolic 
product. Similarly, two levels of insight were discovered. 
The first mini-insights might occur in the afternoon follow-
ing relevant reading in the morning. The second paradigm-
changing insight was characteristically much deeper and 
more profound, often with untold implications across many 
spheres of knowledge. The latter type of insight is exempli-
fied by Darwin’s many years spent analyzing hundreds of 
previously undescribed species which thereafter culminated 
in his formulation of the theory of natural selection. The 
evaluative and elaborative process associated with this deep 
type of insight involves integration with the discipline and 
the larger domain of knowledge. In extreme creativity an 
unintended result maybe the complete overthrow of existing 
tacit assumptions within and across disciplines.37
Deep long-term insight and shorter-term mini-insight can 
further be distinguished on the basis of the type of problem-
solving required.38 A presented problem-solving process 
occurs over a short-time frame where a problem is known 
and pre-existing in the domain. In contrast, the discovered 
problem-finding process is much longer term, typically occur-
ring over years of study and often with ill-defined parameters 
and types of problems. In cases of discovered problem-finding 
processes the actual problem may not be recognized (become 
conscious), until the moment of insight. Incidentally, in this 
review, as we will discuss, ill-defined problems (and also asso-
ciated with discovered problem-finding insightful processes), 
are highly sensitive to right hemisphere prefrontal cortex 
lesions.39 Paradigmatic shifts belong to this latter category of 
insight. When we speak of insight in the layperson’s under-
standing of the term, it appears that intuition is related to 
insight specifically through this incubation stage (Figure 1). 
That is, the incubation stage in discovered problems seem 
to be based on the random convergence and amalgamation 
of ideas (or in our terminology “intuitive schemas”) from 
different disciplines, sometimes facilitated, but not always, 
by interaction with individuals from those fields.36
Hence, due to the sheer difference in time scales and 
orders of complexity between presented and discovered 
problems, problem finding creativity will make greater use 
of subconscious processing.36 Therefore, the preparation 
stage will have a crucial social dimension encompassing 
apprenticeship, mentoring, solitary study and interaction with 
experts, which is conscious, declarative, social and serial in 
nature. In contrast, the incubation stage will allow for multiple 
chunks of dense information units or models to be integrated 
simultaneously in a generate, test, and predict sequence. Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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In Figure 1, we can see where in the model intuition will fit. 
As to be examined in subsequent neuropsychology sections, 
intuition, with its subconscious and automatic features would 
be likely associated with subcortical and limbic connectiv-
ity. Intuition’s automatic and highly routinized nature would 
fit within the high processing bandwidth incubation stage, 
where complex domain-specific models can be generated, 
tested and evaluated. In this context, deep knowledge and 
heuristic structures could be fitted and tweaked until a new 
paradigm emerges into consciousness. The final stage would 
consist of laborious step-wise experimentation, characteristic 
of normal Kuhnian science, that brings a concept, idea, or 
hypothesis to fruition.
In interviews with 100 eminent artists, writers, scien-
tists, and public institution leaders seven prerequisites for 
longer-term problem-finding syntheses were noted.36 The 
creative, insightful individual must have: “…(i) a thorough 
knowledge of one or more symbolic domains; (ii) thorough 
immersion in a field that practices the domain; (iii) focus of 
attention on a problematic area of the domain; (iv) ability 
to internalize information relevant to the problematic area; 
(v) ability to let the relevant information interact with infor-
mation from other domains at a subconscious level where 
parallel processing takes place; (vi) ability to recognize a 
new configuration emerging from this interaction that helps 
resolve the problematic situation; and (vii) evaluation and 
elaboration of the insight in ways that are understandable 
and valuable to the field… (p. 358–359).”36 Hence, we can 
observe that there are already plausible theoretical links 
between objectively defined intuition and insight, and an 
examination of some of the empirical data will further clarify 
our understanding.
Cognitive science, intuition 
and insight
The eureka or aha moment of insight was aptly described 
as the illumination stage,40 and some of the earliest theories 
of insight directly noted that an insight was often preceded 
by an intuition. Metcalfe and Wiebe found that noninsight 
problems (eg, algebra, analytical thinking, logical thinking) 
were open to accurate self-predictions of performance by 
subjects, whereas insight problems were not.41 Similarly, 
whereas analytical problems were solved incrementally over 
time researchers confirmed that insight problems were solved 
with “an opaque leap”. Wallas directly likened this “illumi-
nation stage” to a train or sequence of associations which 
alludes to the role of motor sequencing in the incubation of 
intuitions associated with subsequent insight. Incidentally, 
sequencing has been associated with the integrity of the 
frontal-temporal lobe42 and the associated subcortical basal 
ganglia structures. This sequencing and ostensibly motor 
nature of incubation of intuitions and their transformations 
into insight will be elaborated further in subsequent sections 
of this review.
Figure  A long-term and slow route to creative insight. Copyright © 1995,   The MiT Press.   Adapted from Csikszentmihalyi M, Sawyer K. Creative insight:   The social dimension 
of a solitary moment. in: Sternberg RJ, Davidson Je, editors. The Nature of Insight. Cambridge, MA:   The MiT Press; 1995. p. 329–363.
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Dorfman and colleagues suggested that intuition and 
incubation reflect unconscious processing, which are both 
aspects of implicit thought.43 The concept of implicit learn-
ing is essential to understanding the illumination stage; and 
it is defined as any change in experience, thought, or action 
sequence that is attributable to the acquisition of new seman-
tic or procedural knowledge. This acquisition of knowledge 
occurs under the conditions of the absence of conscious 
awareness of that knowledge. In implicit cognition studies 
there are two related important constructs: the objective and 
subjective threshold. The objective threshold is the point at 
which differential motor response to a stimulus disappears, 
considered as an objectively defined Skinnerian “emitted” 
motor threshold. In contrast the subjective threshold is 
the point at which the stimulus cannot be consciously per-
ceived, usually as indicated by verbal report. Deep semantic 
processing is possible for stimuli presented at subjective 
threshold, whereas the motor response associated with objec-
tive threshold usually is associated with shallow perceptual 
processing.44
Experimental evidence that intuition is directly related to 
insight is chronicled in many studies.45 The remote associ-
ates test is the classic example of insight problem solving46 
however it has also recently been used with much success 
to study intuition.47,48 In the remote associates test or RAT 
word triads are presented to subjects such that the three words 
are semantically related to each other in terms of a common 
fourth target word. Typically, this fourth target word is acti-
vated automatically through spreading activation of semantic 
networks which converges through summation priming on 
the remote associate.49,50 Topolinski and Strack have adapted 
this strategy of the RAT for the objective study of intuition 
by requiring subjects to simply tell whether they can predict 
whether the RAT item is soluble or not.47 This engenders 
that subjects provide a response before 2000 milliseconds 
and subjects can actually recollect a feeling of knowing that 
they either can solve, or not solve, the triad even when they 
do not know the answer to the triad. Subjects can perform 
this intuitive version of the RAT task in less than 2000 msec 
significantly above chance and thus Topolinski and colleagues 
have succeeded in directly linking intuition and insight in a 
superb experimental model.
In the first instance, when two sets of remote association 
items were provided to subjects, purposely only one triad 
could be solved.45 In the absence of a solution, a judgment 
of which triad was coherent or soluble represented only 
a hunch or intuition. Nonetheless, subjects were able to 
choose which triads were soluble at rates greater than chance. 
In the second experiment, sets of remote associate test triads 
were either semantically convergent (eg, goat, pass, green: 
solution = mountain) or semantically divergent (eg, strike, 
same, tennis: solution = match). Congruent with a subcon-
scious semantic priming effect, the semantically convergent 
triad was more likely to be guessed as coherent or soluble.45 
A third experiment illustrated the potential relationship 
between pictorial and verbal perceptual matching in the 
intuition-insight connection. Two types of fragmented objects 
were depicted in the study. In the first picture a familiar object 
was fragmented; the second object was rendered meaningless 
by fragment rotation or displacement. Even when subjects 
could not name the objects, they reported the correct word 
well above chance among four presented match options in 
the meaningful condition.
These experiments demonstrate verbal–verbal and 
verbal–nonverbal semantic priming in the nonverbal ana-
logues of the RAT as well as evidence of dual hemispheric 
processes operative in intuition. This semantic priming of 
intuitive hunches was also replicated for a study of perfor-
mance on insight vignettes.45 In this study, the graphical 
representation of the problem space focused on implicit 
concepts for the insight solver group and conventional 
meanings of words for the noninsight solver groups. Thus, 
multiple lines of evidence support the notion that intuition 
precedes actual insight, through utilization of subconscious 
processes.43 However by what mechanism is this accom-
plished? It appears that, subthreshold activation of separable 
knowledge structures, eventuates in convergence on word 
meanings and is an example of semantic memory priming 
effects.43 Hence verbal-verbal (eg, remote associates test) and 
nonverbal–verbal (eg, fragmented picture and object naming) 
experiments both illustrate subconscious semantic priming. 
A perceptual transformation of components, borrowing 
heavily from Biederman’s recognition by components theory 
of object recognition,51 could account for insight problem 
solving through intuitive processing within the nonverbal 
domain.52 There are plausible neural mechanisms to support 
verbal-nonverbal semantic priming. Tarr found bilateral 
occipitotemporal activation in subjects’ decision-making 
involving nonsensical objects, all constructed with similar 
categorical features. Mental imagery generation also relied 
on the perceptual occipitotemporal cortex used in such basic 
object recognition processes.53
Hence, the essential link between intuition and insight 
is incubation. Incubation has been demonstrated to occur 
only after periods of delay,54 and ability was confirmed 
to interact with incubation performance effects. This is Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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congruent with the hypothesis that the ability of insightful 
individuals to piece together the elements of a solution to 
a problem correlates with their ability to form a conflu-
ence of intuitive ideas through incubation. The finding 
relates directly to our atypical subject hypothesis, to be 
described below. It was found that only high ability students 
benefitted from an incubation period during a word solv-
ing problem.55 This suggests that congruent with many 
previous psychometric studies that there is indeed a reliable 
and solid correlation between high IQ or measured intel-
ligence and the production of highly “insightful products” 
(eg, patents, inventions or wealth creation).56 This evidence 
is illustrative of an “IQ threshold ” that occurs for produc-
tive incubation, in much the same way that no relationship 
has been demonstrated between IQ and creativity, beyond 
an IQ of approximately 120.57
Nonverbal decoding and intuition
Lieberman provides a comprehensive framework for under-
standing what intuition is neuropsychologically, and perhaps 
more importantly, what it is not.30 Some of Lieberman’s 
discussions are relevant to the hypotheses examined in this 
review. Lieberman suggests that intuition is fundamentally 
the “…subjective experience associated with the use of 
knowledge gained through implicit learning… (p. 109).”30 
He directly links intuitive processes with implicit learning 
mechanisms. Damasio similarly notes that intuition results 
from cumulative affective reaction(s), rather than the delib-
erative cost-benefit analysis characteristic of conscious 
analytical processes.58 Lieberman further elaborates the long-
held view that intuition is closely aligned to social judgment 
processes,59 and more relevant to neuropsychology – that it 
is fundamentally related to nonverbal decoding. “…In the 
domain of nonverbal decoding, cue sequences are used to 
gauge the emotions, personality, intentions, attitudes or skill 
levels of others… (p. 111).”30
In manuscripts discussing intuition since Lieberman, if a 
commonality is to be found, it is that nonverbal decoding is 
at the core of a comprehensive understanding of this difficult 
concept.30 Nonverbal subtexts underlining communication 
are numerable; a nonexhaustive list includes: (i) sequenc-
ing (ii) facial expressions (iii) prosody (iv) face value skill 
assessments of others (v) vocal expressions (vi) imitative 
behaviors (vii) fluency (viii) fluidity (ix) timing (x) tone 
of voice (xi) blinking (xii) posture (xiii) meaningful and 
meaningless gesture interpretation and (xiv) gaze direction.30 
Many, nonverbal decoding skills, have been found to rely 
heavily on right hemisphere networks and substrates.60,61 
Similarly, through utilization of modern neuroimaging 
methods, it was discovered that decision-making about the 
agentic qualities of body parts and “point light walkers in 
which the moving joints are illuminated”, consistently acti-
vated the dominant inferior parietal cortex.62–71
Nonverbal decoding is extremely pervasive and is the 
primary means of feedback through which human beings 
“observe” the mental states of others.72 Nonverbal behav-
iors are often more accessible to the people who observe 
them than the actual producers of such actions.73 As human 
beings we are constantly and involuntarily communicating 
rich information pertaining to our emotional states, our 
attitudes, and evaluations of situations. Encoding, then, 
refers to the translation of a mental state into behavioral 
observables similar to those listed above under nonverbal 
subtexts to communication. It is becoming increasingly 
clear that, for the most part, individuals are unaware of 
their own emotional encoding into nonverbal observable 
behaviors.74 In fact, intentional and deliberative manage-
ment of one’s interpersonal impressions through nonver-
bal behavior often lead to substandard results compared 
with the use of intuitive social nonverbal cueing alone.75 
These findings support the existence of a capacity-limited, 
modular nonverbal encoding neural network, with critical 
sequencing capacity, which is separable from the declara-
tive memory system.
In his highly influential review, Lieberman suggested five 
reasons for the similarity between nonverbal decoding and 
implicit learning.30 These include the fact that both involve: 
(i) temporal sequencing and prediction (ii) learning that 
occurs outside of awareness (iii) the generation of represen-
tations and motor skills that are applied absent of awareness 
(iv) division into judgment and action skill components and 
(v) dependence on multiple trial learning. Implicit learning 
figures prominently in these nonverbal decoding experimen-
tal paradigms then. However, such paradigms are difficult 
to explain without actually describing the procedures that 
are involved and Markovian grammars are a good example. 
If covariation and frequency detection are at the core of 
implicit learning, then knowledge of Markovian grammars 
should provide a case in point of what is actually absorbed 
at an abstract level in intuition.76 Markovian grammars are 
based on a complex set of sequencing rules, motor skill 
learning, and classification judgments. Hence participants 
learn probabilistic contingencies among predictors, despite 
the impossibility of conscious analysis.
For example, on a test trial participants are asked to 
classify a sequence as grammatical or nongrammatical. Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 0
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Although participants perform at above chance, they report 
use of intuitive guesswork rather than that of real declarative 
information.77 Further studies have discovered that the deep 
structure of a grammar can transfer to a completely new 
set of pictorial icons78 or even across sensory modalities.79 
These simple experiments suggest that intuition has adapted 
over the course of evolutionary history, to be sensitive to 
highly invariant, sequential, and causal relationships among 
variables in the external environment, particularly with 
respect to cross-modal sensory integration in the nonverbal 
behavior domain. However, missing until recently, were 
comprehensive neuropsychological models of the specific 
neural substrates involved in implicit learning, and hence, 
also in intuition (Figure 2).
The basal ganglia degenerative dementias are illustrative 
of diseases that may be used to understand implicit learning 
and hence intuition’s neural substrates. Parkinson’s disease 
is one such model utilized to gain understanding of sequence 
learning and basal ganglia functioning; since the putamen is 
affected earlier than the caudate.80 Moreover, the putamen is 
connected to motor areas of the cortex, whereas the caudate 
nuclei are connected to the dorsolateral, orbitofrontal, and 
anterior cingulate regions involved respectively in working 
memory; emotion and inhibition; and attentional shifting.81 
This division, along the striatum, led Lieberman to hypoth-
esize that the putamen is involved primarily in nonverbal 
encoding intuitive social action (eg, production). In contrast, 
the caudate has a greater role in the nonverbal decoding essen-
tial for intuitive social cognitive comprehension. Similarly, 
Huntington’s disease results from initial destruction of the 
caudate.82 Incidentally this atrophy correlates with worsening 
performance on the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) 
and the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS).83 Moreover, frontal 
patients performed normally on probability classification 
tasks, whereas Huntington’s patients were impaired.84 This 
implies that the caudate is a seat of higher cognition.
Nonconscious processing and predictive sequenc-
ing also appear to be essential functions performed by 
the basal ganglia.30 Skills initially begin as conscious 
and deliberative, and involve the prefrontal cortex and 
particularly the medial aspect of temporal lobe.85 Gradually, 
with routinization and automaticity, these skills become 
completely under the control of basal ganglia structures 
including the striatum,86 in conjunction with the cerebel-
lum. This also occurs for semantic types of tasks having 
any type of motor component.87 As temporal cues involved 
in sequence learning become increasingly automatized, 
progressive temporal pattern completion processes results 
in individuals being unable to determine which early cues 
could be guiding an intuition.88 This explains the sublime 
difficulty of delineating where, when, and how a particular 
intuition first arose since it progressively becomes automatic 
and under the control of subcortical motor structures. Intu-
ition is then a property of motor sequencing of nonverbal 
cues (Figure 3). When pattern completion occurs, the 
remainder of a sequence can be activated resulting in an 
overall gestalt emerging from partial data.89 The pattern 
completion property of the basal ganglia may explain 
anecdotal evidence of intuition’s capacity to even predict 
future behaviors or seemingly inanimate events happening 
in the distal environment!
Predictive sequencing is exemplified by the serial 
reaction time task in which subjects determine where 
a target will appear on a screen. The training paradigm 
involves the movement of the target through eight repeti-
tive sequences. Over trials subjects implicitly learn the 
sequence, and during the test trial a portion of the sequence 
is altered. This enables the examiner to assess how well the 
Figure  example of a Markovian grammar. Grammatical strings include Xv; TLv; TLTPPRJ; XTRLTRJ. Copyright © 2000,   American Psychological Association.   Adapted from 
Lieberman MD. intuition:   A social cognitive neuroscience approach. Psychol Bull. 2000;126:109–137.
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sequence was learned. Early Parkinson’s disease patients 
were found to be impaired on the serial reaction time task,90 
as were Huntington’s patients,91 while amnesics were found 
completely unimpaired.92 Of significant interest was the find-
ing that Parkinson patients’ performance was unimpaired on 
the task when subjects were directly taught the sequence.93 
The finding implies that nonconscious functions and those 
associated with predictive sequencing are localized in the 
striatum. Analogously, caudate activation was recorded 
during probabilistic classification (eg, the weather prediction 
task), which did not involve motor response. This illustrates 
the difference between putamen-motor and caudate-cogni-
tive network attributes.94 Using Markovian grammars76 
Lieberman and colleagues found that the right caudate 
nucleus was activated in response to generation of abstract 
rules of the grammars.95 Whether there is differential hemi-
spheric caudate activity in other intuitive tasks is a matter for 
empirical inquiry. Moreover, functional connectivity analyses 
showed that the right caudate was negatively correlated 
with activation in the right hippocampus only (r = −0.87) 
suggestive of hemispheric and lateralized intuitive grammar 
abstraction processes.95 Hence, these cognitive nonverbal 
sequencing tasks are elementally similar to nonverbal 
decoding functions of the right inferior hemisphere tracts 
and provide an experimental verification of intuition’s close 
fit with implicit learning paradigms (Figure 4).
Intuition is primary and insight 
is secondary
Feeling-of-knowing is perhaps one of the most elaborate 
accounts of the relationship between objective and subjec-
tive indices of knowing.96 This concept is exemplified by the 
tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon and perhaps illustrates the tem-
poral sequence of intuition and insight. Feeling-of-knowing 
is usually conceived of as consisting of metacognitive 
judgments of ease of processing,97 fluency,98 or subjec-
tive confidence.99 Intuition is characterized:47 by (i) a dim 
awareness of the processes involved (ii) fast and effortless 
nature (iii) independence from intention (iv) generation of 
internal somatic cues such that these processes function to 
integrate vast amounts of complex information.100 In a series 
of 11 elegant experiments it was shown that high fluency 
gave rise to brief positive fluctuations in affect that emerged 
into consciousness as a feeling of ease in making coherence 
judgments of either word triads, visual images, or Markovian 
grammars.47 In these studies subjects completed the verbal 
or image based coherence judgment under time constraints 
such that explicit verbal answers to the problem had not yet 
been arrived at – yet a strong feeling of knowing guided 
performance on the tasks (Figure 5).
Word triads46 usually attributed to bilateral or right 
hemisphere functioning10 were used in the Topolinski and 
Card 4 Card 3 Card 2 Card 1
Pattern
P
(pattern)
P
(rain/
pattern) Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
0 0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.14
0.08
0.08
0.09
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.04
0.14
0.03
0.09
0.03
0.04
0.143
0.375
0.111
0.625
0.167
0.5
0.25
0.857
0.5
0.833
0.333
0.889
0.667
0.75
Figure  in the top picture, the four cards used as cues in the Weather Prediction 
task are depicted. Each card was associated with each possible outcome with a fixed 
probability. in the table is the probability structure of the task. For each pattern, each 
card could be present (1) or absent (0).   The all-present (1111) and all-absent (0000) 
patterns were never used.   The overall probability of rain, given by summing P (Pattern) 
*P (rain/pattern) for all patterns, is 50%. Please note that the weather prediction task 
is not at all like a “video-gambling task” since there is a highly complex rule-governed 
underlying pattern of sequences that can be used to optimize performance much 
like natural patterns in the external world. Copyright © 2002, Cold Spring Harbor 
Laboratory Press. Gluck MA, Shohamy D, Myers C. How do people solve the ‘weather 
prediction’ task?: individual variability in strategies for probabilistic category learning. 
Learn Memory. 2002;9:408–418.
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Figure  The parallel organization of functionally segregrated circuits linking the basal 
ganglia and cortex.   The orbitofrontal cortex and basal ganglia are primary constituents 
of Lieberman’s automatic X-system associated with the skilled performance and 
expertise used in intuitive processes.   The ventral semantic stream twists through the 
basal ganglia’s external capsule linking the posterior occipitotemporal cortex with the 
lateral prefrontal cortex associated with the reflective C-system. Specifically, the right 
anterior superior temporal gyrus is uniquely associated with insight and the caudate 
is associated with intuition. in this model the caudate nucleus provides the primary 
means by which these basal ganglia-dependent (green) and cortical systems (blue) 
can interact and effectively influence each other. Copyright © 1986. Alexander GE, 
DeLong MR, Strick PL. Parallel organization of functionally segregated circuits linking 
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Strack study.47 Previous studies have shown that reading 
of the words is usually processed in the left hemisphere;101 
whereas distant or “coarse” concept mapping between words 
may be the prerogative of the right hemisphere – even in 
subjects that are not right hemisphere dominant.2 Judgments 
of visual coherence in fragmented object contour drawings 
was taken from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart collection.102 
Processing of whole pictures and visual images is usually 
considered a property of the integral functioning of the right 
hemisphere.103 Hence there is some good evidence to suggest 
that intuition is content specific involving verbal and nonver-
bal material and yet that these processes are still temporally 
and structurally the same.47 Since these studies used the 
same archetypal task that is used in insight studies namely 
the word triads, and generalized these findings to other tasks 
(object contour drawings and Markovian grammars)48,104–106 
this illustrates how intuition is primary. This last point is all 
the more true since the archetypal remote associates task is 
entirely consistent with more real-world insight tasks.107
Emotion, affect, and mood 
in intuition?
The first stage of stimulus emotional appraisal is the distinc-
tion between positive and negative affective valence.108 The 
basal ganglia appear involved in this initial assessment of 
positive stimuli;30 since left basal ganglia lesions reliably 
result in depression,109 and because both Parkinson’s and 
Huntington’s disease110 often are associated with organic 
depression. Unipolar depressive disorder is associated with 
decreased metabolism in the basal ganglia,111 as well as with 
significantly increased serotonin binding potential (indicative 
of decreased serotoninergic tone during episodes), within the 
striatum.112 In contrast the amygdala controls bodily responses 
to aversive stimuli and plays a central role in responding to 
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Figure  Although research suggests that presented insight problems do indeed rely on more lateralized right hemispheric processes – the question as to whether longer-term 
revolutionary insights do as well is open to conjecture and is purely speculative. However, the convergent theme that right hemispheric dominance could accentuate the 
development of revolutionary insights is borne out by the analysis of atypical subjects and our discussions of three of the most influential intellectuals of the 20th century. 
For example, Freud developed his theory of the unconscious through uncanny observations about socioemotional functions in his patients and biographers have questioned 
question whether einstein had some form of developmental dyslexia (eg, see Heilman for discussions of deep dyslexia).17 Finally, Darwin developed his theory of natural selection 
through the integration of huge volumes of information derived from his drawings of different species. Another timely and interesting trend was that this year alone in 2009 five 
of thirteen new Nobel Laureates were women, the largest number to ever join the ranks in a single year. Copyright © 2009. Adapted and redrawn from Topolinski S, Strack F. 
The architecture of intuition: Fluency and affect determine intuitive judgments of semantic and visual coherence and judgments of grammaticality in artificial grammar learning. 
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fear-inducing and negatively-valenced stimuli.113 Arguably, 
the basal ganglia (particularly the striatum) and the amyg-
dala comprise two essential way-stations to the positive and 
negative affective stimulus appraisals typical of the intuitive 
social cognition system.
Interestingly, female superiority in terms of nonverbal 
behavior decoding skill114 and an estrogen-mediated stria-
tal increased performance function on sequential learning 
tasks,115 provide empirical and anecdotal corroboration of a 
biologically based female advantage on many complex intui-
tive social cognition tasks.30 These female advantages seem 
to be manifest in enhanced cortical–subcortical connectivity. 
Individual differences in the subcortical transfer of semantic-
motor information has been hypothesized for some time.116 
In a study of commissural transfer it was found that those 
with strong leftward hemisphere dominance tended to have 
smaller areas within the midbody of the callosum.117 However 
there is good evidence of neural plasticity and canalization of 
function through the subcortical and cortical commissures. 
Marzi and colleagues showed that visuomotor interhemi-
spheric transfer takes place through the parietal commissures 
in normals, and through the anterior or subcortical commis-
sures in a commissurotomy subject using positron emission 
tomography.118 Collectively, then, gender differences in 
both interhemispheric, and perhaps more provocatively, 
intrahemispheric subcortical-cortical connectivity, could be 
worthy of future intuition and insight studies.
At the level of analysis of nonverbal decoding differences, 
and in the context of social psychology, there are several 
implications for such individual and group differences. This 
is illustrated by two well-known theories of social cognition 
and attitude change.119,120 At the time both theories were 
heavily reliant on a declarative memory system where it 
was assumed that declarative memory for counter-attitudinal 
behavior was essential for behavior-induced attitude 
change.30 However, a recent study of attitude change in 
anterograde amnesics found contrarily that these subjects 
showed as much attitude change as did control participants.121 
Similarly, a reflected appraisal or “what she thinks he thinks 
of her” resulted in activation of an entirely right hemispheric 
network, including the ventrolateral prefrontal and medial 
temporal cortex, medial parietal lobe, when compared with 
self-directed appraisal.122
A right hemisphere based nonverbal decoding advantage 
that facilitates female intuitive judgments is consistent 
with all of the above hypotheses. In addition, if the right 
hemisphere network runs anteriorly and ventrally, extending 
from the occipitotemporal cortex to the orbital and dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex, it is likely to involve the rapid 
conducting inferior occipitofrontal fasciculus.123,124 Clearly, 
cortical and noncortical substrates are involved in any con-
temporary model for emotional interaction in the appraisal 
of intuitive tasks. For instance, re-appraisal of a strategy 
for emotional self-control or self-regulation, in which sub-
jects were required to decrease and control negative affect, 
involved activation of the right lateral orbitofrontal cortex 
implicated in behavioral inhibition.125 Similarly, studies 
have shown that unintentional affect labeling, resulted in 
increased activity in the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, 
with a resultant inverse relationship between activity in the 
prefrontal area and activity within the amygdala.126
Neural correlates of intuition
Lesion studies are not the only means of examining the 
neural correlates of right hemisphere based nonverbal 
decoding. One conceptualization of intuition is that it results 
from the integration of affectively laden gists with uncon-
sciously represented decision-making information. Lesions 
of the orbitofrontal cortex result in reliable deficiencies in 
decision-making of this type.127 Goal valuation is associ-
ated with neural activity in the medial orbitofrontal cortex, 
whereas decision valuation is associated with activity in the 
central orbitofrontal cortex, and prediction error signaling 
is associated with reliable activity in the ventral striatum.128 
Hence, orbitofrontally lesioned patients were found unable 
to integrate emotional and visceral signals into decision-
making scenarios.27 The orbitofrontal ventral neural network 
hypothesis of intuition and insight will be developed further 
in a subsequent section.
In one study, participants were presented with fragmented 
black-and-white line drawings of common objects26 taken 
from Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s collection.102 The task was 
to determine if the object was meaningful (real object) or non-
meaningful (nonobject). Subjects were asked not to name the 
object, but rather to rely on their gut feeling about whether the 
pictured stimulus depicted a coherent gestalt. The investiga-
tors found activation in the medial orbitofrontal cortex when 
a fragmented drawing was judged a coherent gestalt. When 
subjects were asked to individuate objects in a neuroimaging 
study it was found left orbitofrontal cortex activity 50 msec 
earlier than activity recorded in the fusiform gyrus.124 These 
findings suggest that low frequency information in such 
drawings facilitates object recognition by initiating top-down 
processes projected from orbitofrontal to visual cortex. It is 
possible that a similar right-sided orbitofrontal network exists 
in right hemisphere dominant individuals.Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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Again, from a functional neuroanatomical perspec-
tive there are specific hypotheses about what white matter 
tracts would transfer such information. It was proposed that 
the information being transferred from the orbitofrontal 
cortex26 to the inferior temporal cortex utilizes the inferior 
occipitofrontal fasciculus.129 By way of digression the ventral 
occipitotemporal cortex consists of the fusiform gyrus later-
ally to the parahippocampal gyrus medially; activation in the 
ventral occipitotemporal cortex was suggested to represent 
holistic object perception processes. However, it is possible 
that another route, other than the inferior occipitofrontal 
fasciculus, conveys part or all of this information. A second 
possibility would be the inferior longitudinal fasciculus con-
necting the occipital and anterior temporal lobes, in tandem 
with the uncinate fasciculus connection from the anterior 
temporal lobe on to the orbitofrontal cortex. However, it 
is suggested that this second U-shaped fiber two-way route 
would be incapable of the required less than 50 msec neural 
transmission26 shown to be necessary in Bar and colleagues’s 
magnetoencephalography study.124
The second two-way route described above carries 
visuosemantic information emanating from the temporal 
pole.130 Therefore, the inferior frontooccipital fasciculus is 
likely a primary conduit of the intuitive knowledge network.26 
And functional connectivity analysis demonstrates simultane-
ous activation within right anterior claustrum, anterior insula, 
and amygdala. The claustrum is closely associated with 
striatal functioning and could be involved in synchronization 
of large-scale whole brain networks.131 This function would 
allow an affectively valenced percept to exhibit a characteristic 
judgmental sense of rightness by temporally linking intuitive 
processers. Such a clock-like mechanism could also account 
for the anecdotal findings of a fundamental aspect of intuition 
which is initiating the correct behavior at the optimal time. 
Finally, this right hemispheric network extending posteriorly 
from the right inferior occipitoparietal lobe all the way on to the 
right orbitofrontal cortex would also be congruent with findings 
suggesting that these structures constitute a “when or optimal 
timing pathway” for stimuli within both visual fields.132
Neural correlates of insight
Intuition, then, is associated with ventral mixed cortical–
subcortical interconnected networks extending from the 
most anterior and posterior reaches of the cerebral cortex. 
These building blocks of intuition are involved in automatic, 
nonconscious, and skilled nonverbal decoding especially 
associated with the right posterior parietal regions. Insight, 
by contrast, is a conscious and deliberative process at least 
past the point of restructuring. Recall that restructuring is 
the rotation of multiple concepts in memory until a semantic 
gestalt is arrived at that seems logical from any vantage point. 
Ilg and colleagues used a unique design133 in which aspects of 
the RAT46 were modified so that subjects were required to pro-
vide speedy responses. Recall that RAT problems consist of a 
word triad such as (pine, crab, sauce) and the subject attempts 
to produce a single solution word (apple). The solution word 
can form a familiar compound word or phrase with each of 
the three problem words (pineapple, crab apple, applesauce). 
RAT and classic insight problems are similar in that these 
short items (i) misdirect retrieval (ii) solving processes are 
nonreportable and (iii) elicit aha or eureka responses.134
These word triads are not as complex as classic insight 
problems and have advantages of being able to be: (i) solved 
in short period of time; (ii) have single unambiguous word 
answers; and are (iii) physically compact for presentation 
in functional neuroimaging environments. Finally, and most 
importantly, these “mini-insight” problems are highly corre-
lated with lengthy verbal insight problems.23,107 Therefore given 
the speeded response in the Ilg study only a subconscious intui-
tive coherence judgment could be elicited and not an explicit 
judgment. Recall that the RAT is the abbreviated insight 
problem of choice where the ‘eureka’ or ‘aha’ experience can 
be tested for.10 The condition of explicit judgment (eg, the par-
ticipants actually picked out the correct RAT) was subtracted 
from those who made an implicit judgment of coherence 
condition (eg, an implicit judgment that yes the three words 
were coherent but that the solution was not conscious). In 
this intuitive experimental condition, reliable activations were 
found in the heteromodal bilateral inferior parietal cortex and 
the right superior posterior temporal cortex.133
The results of this experiment were unambiguous and 
confirmed that intuition and insight are related entities. In 
contrast, increased activation in the anterior right superior 
temporal cortex was found during sudden insight,135 using 
either electroencephalography (EEG) or fMRI. In an insight 
EEG study, a negative correlation between subjective ratings 
of the problem restructuring process and the feeling of sudden-
ness of the solution, suggested that restructuring involves an 
automatic, subconscious recombination of information.136–138 
Similarly, the researchers found increased upper alpha band 
response in right temporal regions, that was interpreted as 
suppression of weakly activated solution information.137 
Mental impasse was associated with activation in parieto-
occipital regions in the gamma band and was hypothesized 
to be associated with inappropriate problem representation 
and an overload of selective attention.139 Finally, in trials Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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with high restructuring, decreased alpha power indicative 
of greater cortical excitation, was discovered in the right 
prefrontal cortex. Tellingly, both lesion140 and fMRI141 studies 
similarly have shown that restructuring of insight problems 
involves the right prefrontal cortex as well.
Right hemisphere biases in processing occur when prob-
lem solver’s aha experiences are associated with insight solu-
tions and especially with subconscious semantic priming.142 
However the comprehension associated with insight is not 
completely unilateral. Bilateral anterior superior temporal 
gyral neural activity has been found to correlate with compre-
hension of sentences and complex discourse143,144 and these 
areas are probably recruited during the initial setting of the 
parameters of a verbal insight problem. Also signal originat-
ing in the right anterior superior temporal gyrus during insight 
problem solving was not due to emotion associated with 
“aha” because it only increased when subjects first encoun-
tered this problem.135 Revealingly, right hemisphere coarse 
coding may not be restricted to only nouns since generating 
unusual verbs to nouns resulted in activity in the right frontal 
gyri,145 and comprehending extended discourse resulted in 
activity in right frontal lobe.146
This importance of the right frontal cortex in restructur-
ing, associated with insight problem-solving is noteworthy. 
Frith suggested that of the myriad functions of the prefrontal 
cortex, ‘sculpting of the response space’ subsumed them all.147 
That is the dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is crucial 
for defining a set of responses, suitable for a particular task, 
and then biasing these for selection. The matchstick insight 
problem is another example of a complex insight problem 
where configurations of matches must be used to solve Roman 
Numeral type diagrams with explicit rule-based constraints. 
The matchstick insight arithmetic task is biased by strong 
constraints, that prevent participants from considering and 
evaluating the correct solution;148 and eye movement stud-
ies support that problem restructuring occurs by constraint 
relaxation and chunk decomposition.24 That is one set of 
constraints or rules are ignored so that other essential features 
of the problem can be attended to in sequence (constraint 
relaxation) and/or chunks of the problem are decomposed into 
more manageable units (chunk decomposition).
The DLPFC therefore excludes the correct interpreta-
tion since normals solved only 43% of the most difficult 
matchstick problems; whereas 82% of DLPFC patients did.149 
Carlo Reverberi noted this effect was stronger in right DLPFC 
(pers comm, Sept 2008). Hence, the right DLPFC could 
have an essential role in constraining the response space 
of insight problems. This fits assumptions about real world 
scenarios where preliminary downgrading of all potential 
possibilities is essential in order to gain traction on a com-
plex insight problem. Hence, a number of generalizations 
about the functional relationships of intuition and insight 
include: (i) intuition is associated with nonverbal decoding 
(ii) intuition is associated with implicit and reflexive pro-
cesses (iii) insight is associated with conscious restructuring 
processes (iv) intuition feeds into insight based right hemi-
sphere networks through the right caudate95 and is modulated 
by the orbitofrontal cortex.81 In a very real sense then intuition 
is primary and insight is only a secondary process that is 
reliant on the expertise and automaticity of intuition.
Conscious and unconscious 
processes
If we are discussing the right hemisphere, then surely any 
examination of superior social cognition constructs like 
intuition and insight must elaborate on how these processes 
relate to the weighty topic of the “self ”. It is difficult to 
imagine concepts like intuition and insight, that that are 
so lawfully and obviously related to the construct of con-
sciousness, would not also have empirical and theoretical 
relationships with consciousness’s object, the self. Indeed, 
many studies using structural, functional neuroimaging, 
and lesion methods have definitively localized salient 
aspects of the “self ” to the right hemisphere.150 The self 
usually is, after all, associated both in common parlance, 
and within neuropsychological theory, with the right 
hemisphere’s emotion and gnostic functions.61 The UCLA 
social cognitive neuroscience laboratory similarly has made 
progress on hypotheses concerning the self’s relationship to 
intuition, and to a lesser extent insight. In Lieberman and 
colleagues’ terminology, the C-system (an abbreviation for 
the C in refleCtive), is implicated in intentional social cog-
nition, which takes effort and is reliant on propositionally 
organized symbolic representations that can be processed 
serially, in working and episodic memory.151 That episodic 
and working memory function together in the C-system is 
evidenced in levels of processing research which concludes 
that greater working memory demand at encoding, results 
in superior episodic retrieval success.152 Neural correlates 
of the C-system include the lateral prefrontal cortex, poste-
rior parietal cortex, hippocampus and the medial temporal 
lobe structures.153 Hence, C-system structures are used for 
evidence-based self knowledge, similar to those associated 
with propositional reasoning154 (Figure 6).
A series of ingenuous experiments revealed that the 
X- and C-systems have definitive relationships with the Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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concept of the self. When participants made self-judgments 
in domains in which they had little experience, there was 
strong evidence for the use of episodic retrieval.155 Therefore, 
evidence-based self knowledge is not the only means of 
self-judgment, and it may be limited to those low experience 
domains of knowledge that subjects have about themselves. 
In other words if subjects make decisions about themselves 
in a domain that they have little knowledge they will more 
often than not use the reflective C-system. In contrast, if 
subjects make decisions about themselves in domains that 
they tend to be experts in they will use the X-system. A pro-
vocative example is that of patient DB who was permanently 
amnesic for his entire life, yet was able to make accurate 
self-referential personality ratings.156
Thus the X-system (as the X is used in refleXive), 
automatically collates social and affective variables and 
produces habitual responses.151 The X-system consists of 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia, amygdala 
and the lateral temporal cortex.157 This research group con-
ducted a fMRI study in which soccer players or actors made 
self-judgments in a high-experience or low-experience 
domain respectively.154 The purpose of the study was to 
separate the neural substrates of the volitional C-system 
and the automatic X-system. Subjects made decisions on 
whether actor or athlete words described themselves accu-
rately. The results showed that self-descriptive judgments 
from high and low-experience domains were the same 
for both groups. This finding suggested generalizability 
across expertise domains and an index of schematicity 
was computed. The index of schematicity reflected the 
degree of schema strength in the high-experience domain 
relative to the low-experience domain. It was predicted 
that higher difference scores reflected the presence of a 
more developed schema in the high experience domain.154 
Regions found more active in the intuition-based self-
knowledge judgments, associated with the X-system’s 
high-experience domain, included the left ventral frontal 
cortex, the left nucleus accumbens of the basal ganglia, 
the left amygdala, the right lateral temporal cortex and 
the right posterior parietal cortex. In contrast, the only 
regions activated with the C-system in nonschematics 
included the right hippocampus, the bilateral precuneus, 
and the bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.154 The ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex was uniquely activated by the 
X-system and the hippocampus was uniquely activated by 
the C-system such that when subjects made judgments in 
their high-experience domain, they elicited activation in a 
network of regions not normally associated with episodic 
recall or explicit evaluation. However, when assessments 
were made in their low experience domain, only the lateral 
prefrontal cortex was differentially activated.154
Similarly, implicit learning is associated with the 
unintentional learning of probabilistic relationships between 
various cues.158 The increased activity in the basal ganglia 
and orbitofrontal cortex during intuited self-knowledge 
are highly consistent with an implicit/explicit memory 
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Figure  Neural correlates of the C-system and the X-system displayed on a canonical brain rendering from side (A) and bottom (B) views. C-system regions displayed 
are the lateral prefrontal cortex (C1), hippocampus and medial temporal lobe (C2), and the posterior parietal cortex (C3). X-system regions displayed are the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (X1), nucleus accumbens of the basal ganglia (X2), amygdala (X3) and the lateral temporal cortex (X4). Please note that the hippocampus, nucleus accumbens 
and amygdala are displayed on the cortical surface for the sake of clarity. Copyright © 2004,   American Psychological Association.   Adapted from Lieberman MD, Jarcho JM, 
Satpute AB. evidence-based and intuition-based self-knowledge:   An fMRi study.  J Pers Soc Psychol. 2004;87:421–435.Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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dichotomy. Ventromedial prefrontal cortex activation was 
recorded for the implicit association test,159 providing sup-
port for the automaticity-hierarchical delineation. Finally, 
when nonschematics made intuitive judgments, reliable 
activation was recorded in the lateral temporal cortex, 
which has been associated with semantic memory func-
tions.160 In sum, partial support was found for a combination 
of implicit/explicit, automatic-controlled processes and 
episodic/semantic memory involved in intuitive-like func-
tions. However, event-related designs likely would be more 
helpful in determining what aspects of the neural systems 
are used in intuition. Hence, the functional neuroanatomy 
of the intuitive networks implies that the X-system is: 
(i) affective (ii) slow to form (iii) resistant to and slow to 
change (iv) insensitive to one’s thoughts about one’s own self 
and finally (v) insensitive to explicit declarative feedback 
from others.154 There is good evidence to suggest that the 
C-system is relied on only by default in novel decision-
making (such as novel insight problems), when heuristic 
automatic judgments based on associative and intuitive 
systems are unreliable.
Moreover, the main purpose of the [C-system] is to 
monitor the [X-system] decisions and correct them when 
wrong.161 Other studies suggest that another function of the 
intuitive ventral frontal and basal ganglia driven X-system 
is to usurp effortful, analytical processes over time so that 
comparable automatization benefits can be achieved with 
minimal efforts.162 Usurping of cortical functions by basal 
ganglia subcortical structures is congruent with the known 
functions of these structures and with previously reviewed 
striatal skill acquiescence. Congruently consumption of 
glucose restored effortful C-system functions on a decision-
making task following completion of a dual-task paradigm.163 
Thus tired subjects tended to rely on heuristic, automatic 
decision making strategy, characteristic of the X-system. 
The caudate of the basal ganglia thus acts like a way-sta-
tion that directs cognitive activity along automatic default 
processing networks unless novel stimuli require frontotem-
poral evaluation of conscious analytical signals processed for 
affective valence in orbitofrontal cortex.124
A right hemisphere ventral network 
in intuition and insight?
An example of a pervasive type of intuitive social cognition is 
that of the use of scripts, and the facility with which one uses 
these tools determines in part one’s level of social competence.164 
Scripts are over-learned narratives that indicate a culturally 
agreed upon order of events in social episodes. Scripts have a 
core feature of sequencing of gestalt nonverbal actions. These 
tools allow inference behavior that may not have been directly 
witnessed and thereby can be used by intuition or insight to 
infer mental states. Scripts are similar to structured event 
complexes associated with the functional social purposes of 
the prefrontal cortex.165 A structured event complex contains 
macro-level information relevant to past and current behavior 
through the storing of events that occurred in the past, and may 
be likely to occur again in the future. Each structured event 
complex stores both the theme and the boundaries of events 
assigned to it. However it does not simply re-represent words 
and objects stored in posterior association areas of the brain. 
A structured event complex enables flexible encoding of input 
allowing for inference and generalization and it stores events 
that are temporally bound together in close proximity.
A managerial knowledge unit is composed of a series 
of such structured event complexes and are based on: 
(i) sequencing (ii) flexibility in sequencing (iii) problem 
constraint satisfaction (iv) basal frequencies of sequences 
(v) durations (vi) contexts of settings for actions and (vii) goal-
sub-goal hierarchies. A sequence of agreed upon actions for a 
dinner date would be an example of a managerial knowledge 
unit.165 Judgments of temporal contiguity between adjacent 
action sequences was found to be a function of activation in 
the posterior association cortex, whereas goal structuring of 
scripts was found to be a function of the prefrontal cortex.166 
Script generation versus execution errors in dysexecutive 
patients was consistent with a caudate, rather than a putame-
nal link in cognitive function.167 Likewise, the right inferior 
frontal gyrus was activated in a script ordering task,168 while 
right orbitofrontal cortex damage resulted in impairment in the 
accessibility of scripts, as well as in the semantic representa-
tion of social activities.169 Developmentally we can see the 
linking of nonverbal sequences in the right occipitotemporo-
parietal regions with abstractions of these nonverbal sequences 
in the form of scripts in the right orbitofrontal cortex.
Huntington’s170 and Parkinson’s patients demonstrated 
script sequencing deficits.171 Given the ventral loci of the 
right orbitofrontal script reading neural network, parallels can 
be drawn to a recently described “ventral semantic stream”, 
present within the right hemisphere.172 The pathway joins the 
posterior and superior temporal areas with the inferior and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, through the inferior occipito-
frontal fasciculus. The fasciculus narrows at the junction of 
the frontal and temporal lobes and passes through the anterior 
floor of the external capsule of the ganglia, with terminal 
radiations reaching the middle and inferior temporal gyri 
and traveling without interruption to the lingual and fusiform Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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gyri.123 We can see then that these fasiculi could possibly 
allow ready connectivity between posterior nonverbal decod-
ing networks and the automatization associated with striatal 
networks moderated by context information within the right 
orbitofrontal regions.
Electrostimulation anywhere within this fasiculi resulted 
in semantic paraphasias.172 Semantic paraphasic errors are 
exemplified by labeling a presented object such as a “banana” 
as a “hammer”. We have previously reviewed how coarse, 
sparse or distant semantic mappings are an intrinsic prop-
erty of the right hemisphere. Given inferior occipitofrontal 
fasciculus proximity and connectivity to the orbitofrontal 
cortex, it is hypothesized that the ventral right hemispheric 
rapid conducting pathway links the right inferior posterior 
parietal nonverbal decoding regions with the rostral cogni-
tive script interpreters associated intuition and insight. When 
comparing novel gesture interpretation or naturalistic action 
in the right inferior parietal lobes,173 with the interpretation 
of scripts in the right orbitofrontal cortex,168,169 there is a 
clear anterior-posterior demarcation in complexity of the 
social psychological functions. This ventral right hemisphere 
network appears to be essential in intuition and insight for 
many strong empirical cognitive science, neuropsychologi-
cal, and anatomical reasons previously reviewed. Yet the true 
test of such a hypothesis would be to carefully examine such 
hypothesized right hemisphere dominant patients using struc-
tural and functional neuroimaging as well as comprehensive 
neuropsychological assessment. In the past the only way 
that such patients would be found would have been through 
the rare occurrence of a small localized stroke within either 
Broca or Wernicke’s area in the right hemisphere without 
any attendant secondary dementing processes or confound 
present. These cases are exceedingly rare.
Crossed aphasia from the historical 
perspective
Before the era of functional neuroimaging, studies of crossed 
aphasia provided the only means to examine inferences 
regarding the nature and organization of atypical language 
and spatial functions when localized to the right hemisphere. 
In the most comprehensive meta-analytic study to date, of 
crossed aphasia in dextrals, Marien and colleagues found that 
65% demonstrated constructional apraxia; 39% demonstrated 
both constructional apraxia and visuospatial neglect; 8% 
showed visuospatial neglect but not constructional apraxia; 
and finally, 26% demonstrated constructional apraxia without 
visuospatial neglect.174 This meta-analysis revealed that 
there is considerable heterogeneity in the type and location 
of different modules within the nondominant hemisphere 
in crossed aphasics. If there is a near random distribution 
in which these and other cognitive functions can be local-
ized in one hemisphere or the other, as well as co-localized 
together in different combinations, then this principle pro-
vides some circumstantial support for the hypothesis of the 
possibility of emergent properties that are qualitatively dif-
ferent than individual components themselves (Figure 7).
Moreover, the incidence of constructional apraxia was 
greater than threefold the incidence of visuospatial neglect, 
and visuospatial neglect occurred at less than 10% in the 
sample. Since visuospatial neglect is the sine qua non of 
“crowding”, the low incidence where there is increased later-
alization of cognitive processes, can readily be interpreted as 
strong evidence contrary to the crowding hypothesis. Crowd-
ing suggests that with co-localization of language and spatial 
functions to the right hemisphere there is decrements in the 
performance capacities of both cognitive functions. Yet the 
high incidences of constructional apraxia suggests that this 
function often co-associates with other modular functions 
in these subjects. In other words, the results do not support 
the assertion that right-hemisphere language always is asso-
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Figure  Archetypal configuration of specific co-localized cognitive modules in 
normally represented lateralization of functions subjects. in Marien and colleagues’174 
study of crossed aphasics with singular right hemisphere lesions a secondary analysis 
was undertaken. Buccofacial praxis was correlated with limb praxis (r = 0.41, P  0.01) 
and writing (r = 0.39, P  0.05). Limb praxis was correlated with writing (r = 0.67, 
P  0.001) and visuospatial functions (r = 0.40, P  0.05). Finally, visuospatial func-
tions were correlated with constructional praxis (r = 0.35, P  0.05). Copyright © 
1991.   Adapted with permission from Fischer RS, Alexander MP, Gabriel C, Gould e, 
Milione J. Reversed lateralization of cognitive functions in right-handers: exceptions 
to classical aphasiology. Brain. 1991;114:245–261.Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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ciated with the crowding out of other cognitive functions, 
such as that of visuospatial neglect and constructional praxis. 
In fact, crossed aphasia in dextrals likely constitutes a highly 
selected sample. Indeed, Marien and colleagues note that 
although “…both neglect and constructional apraxia stand 
out as frequent nonverbal disorders in vascular crossed 
aphasia in dextrals, often, though not inherently, [do these 
symptoms] associated with each other… (p. 55).”174 Hence, 
support for the crowding hypothesis, which historically was 
associated with the neurolinguistic hypothesis that the right 
hemisphere was communicatively inferior4 is not borne out 
by the data.
Indeed in 6 of 10 atypical language localization subjects 
a complete reversal of linguistic and spatial functions was 
found, and four alone showed co-extensive language and 
spatial attention processes.8 A subsequent study found that 
right hemispheric language dominant subjects had a greater 
tendency towards bilateral or leftward dominance for spa-
tial attention suggesting developmental pressures towards 
complete reversal of linguistic and spatial functions.175 
Some of the best evidence for the basal rates of unequivo-
cal right hemisphere language in the general population 
would be found in the crossed aphasia literature pertaining 
to dextrals.174 Based on 152 cases published since 1975, 
only 32% could be reliably categorized into crossed aphasia 
in dextrals after exclusionary criteria such as nondextral-
ity, unilaterality of lesion, no prior premorbidity, illiteracy, 
second language or presence of ideographic scripts or tonal 
languages were applied.
This constitutes a mere 48 known cases of verified crossed 
aphasia in the published literature since 1975. Interestingly, 
the frequency of occurrence of crossed aphasia in dextrals 
was compared between men and women, and men outnum-
bered women by nearly 3:1. The frequency distribution 
could perhaps provide clues to the inheritance mechanisms 
of this anomalous pattern of language representation. Spe-
cifically, in agreement with prior studies it suggests that 
an X-linked allele could encode the phenotype in normal 
healthy individuals.174 However it is possible that this ratio 
could be entirely a statistical artifact (and in fact very likely 
underestimates crossed aphasia in dextral women), since 
women routinely do not suffer the same degree of aphasic 
symptoms after unilateral stroke lesions due to the predomi-
nance of bilaterality of language localization. Secondly, when 
compared to men of the same age when women do have 
strokes that are debilitating they are usually so serious that 
they are rendered untestable and therefore would be naturally 
excluded from any such studies.176
Visuospatial neglect, the sine qua non of crowding, was 
found more severe in crossed aphasia in dextral women 
than in men! More detailed studies would be necessary to 
corroborate this apparent gender-linked finding. Secondly, 
in noncrossed aphasia there is a preponderance of nonfluent 
(eg, frontal) as opposed to fluent (eg, posterior) aphasics, 
whereas, with crossed aphasia, there is an equivalent fre-
quency of such findings.174 Recall that noncrossed aphasia 
is the condition when a patient sustains a serious stroke 
within the left perisylvian language cortex that would be 
expected to result in either fluent or nonfluent aphasia yet 
does not – implying by default language localization to the 
nondominant right hemisphere. This frontality of noncrossed 
aphasics versus equivalent frequency of frontal or posterior 
crossed aphasics could be a function of the greater spatial 
distribution of language localization within the right hemi-
sphere.2 Incidentally and as expected this neuroanatomical 
greater spatial distribution of language processors within the 
right hemisphere educed from the frequency of proportions of 
aphasic in the crossed and noncrossed varieties agrees with 
the spatial summation priming and coarse coding hypothesis 
borne out by neuropsychological studies.50
Additionally, it was found that typology of crossed 
aphasia was independent of age, perhaps suggesting genetic 
determination for the spatial localization since older aged 
crossed aphasics did not happen to have more serious 
(eg, global aphasia) strokes.174 Again this implies that it is the 
nature of the spatial localization of crossed aphasia per se, 
rather than some intervening variable such as a pre-existent 
higher frequency of incidental arteriovenous malformations 
that is mediating the lateralized effect. Other important find-
ings include that agraphia in crossed aphasics was found to 
be particularly severe pointing the way to examination of 
unique language and praxis localization and co-localization 
scenarios occurring in this population. Finally, estimates 
of the prevalence of the potential cases of crossed aphasia 
in dextrals vary. A 4% incidence of rightward language 
lateralization using transcranial Doppler sonography has 
been found,177 and 6% using fMRI.178 In the context of the 
exclusionary criteria this would provide a 1%–2% estimate 
of the general population as unequivocally showing strong 
right hemisphere dominant language in agreement with 
earlier surveys.179
A few points are worthy of mention in regards to crossed 
aphasia in dextrals and praxis localization. Again, visuospatial 
neglect was recorded in 43% of males and 57% of female 
crossed aphasia in dextral subjects.174 In contrast, either 
ideomotor or ideational apraxia which is associated with Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 0
McCrea Dovepress
submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
Dovepress 
dominant hemisphere functioning, was found in 18% of male 
subjects and 38% of females. These findings suggest that in 
well-characterized subjects, less than half of crossed aphasics 
demonstrate the putative crowding out of other cognitive 
functions. This is an important point to be considered when 
analyzing the Marien and colleagues study since crowding 
is almost taken to be that of a given in conventional wisdom 
accepted by clinical neuropsychologists. Furthermore, the 
low frequency of apraxias associated with right-hemisphere 
subjects, suggests, that in atypicals, there are bilateral parallel 
distributions, perhaps more so in men or patent co-localization 
of praxis and language especially in women. Hence in males, 
praxis and language dissociation subjects may be particularly 
apt to demonstrate complete mirror reversal in this domain.180 
There is no obvious reason as to why language and praxis 
would so routinely be parcellated to the opposite hemisphere 
in atypical or anomalous subjects!
It is likely that multiple genetic polymorphisms impact 
on the higher-order factor of general ability, and that stud-
ies of small population samples with rare high score IQ’s, 
are unlikely to target specific critically involved genes.181 In 
this context, specific cases like that of the right-hemisphere 
dominant individuals discussed above, could be informa-
tive on specific genetic mechanisms involved in normal 
neurodevelopment, which are likely to be far more numerous 
and diverse than the generalist genes integral to basic cel-
lular function, memory, and measured fluid intelligence.181 
Congruent with the ‘perception of action’ hypothesis special-
ization, atypical subjects’ right-hemisphere representations 
and associated cognitive processes may provide an advantage 
in complex matching tasks using perceptual recognition and 
integration of complex motor informational schemas. This 
memory for action specialization, rather than memory for 
declarative content as typified by the cognitive processes 
tapped by traditional IQ tests, could be explained by any 
number of plausible hypotheses.
There are other reasons as to why in the vast majority 
of crossed aphasia in dextral subjects might have separate 
praxis and language localization. By virtue of atypical sub-
ject connectivity to bilateral motor response mechanisms, it 
might be possible for such subjects to demonstrate superior-
ity in complex verbal–motor perceptual matching tasks. For 
instance, the right hemisphere is known: (i) to elicit broader 
activation of semantic categories (ii) far greater sensitivity 
to distant prime-target pairs (iii) involvement in implicit 
rather than explicit retrieval (iv) usefulness for predictive 
inferences (v) for application of knowledge (vi) for lengthy 
latency of activation to primes (vii) for more diffuse and 
wider interconnectivity (viii) for better use of strategy (ix) for 
propensity for global aspects of language, and (x) for greater 
facility for ambiguous discourse.2 Further consideration of 
right hemisphere dominant atypical subjects and semantic 
networks; handedness; unusual praxic co-localization could 
suggest methods by which these unique subjects could be 
studied in the future.
Praxis lateralization and 
handedness in anomalous subjects
Aphasia after right hemisphere damage is greater in left-
handers than in right-handers and occurs with a frequency 
of approximately 30%.182 As Alexander and Annett hypoth-
esized:183 “…The [rights shift theory] proposes to explain the 
typical pattern of cerebral asymmetry and normal variations 
as due to the presence and absence of a single gene (rs+). This 
gene confers some relative advantages on the left hemisphere 
which induces the left side to serve speech and also gives a 
relative advantage to the right hand. It does not determine 
handedness, but it shifts a chance distribution of handedness 
toward dextrality. In the absence of the gene (rs – genotype) 
lateralizations of language and of handedness, and pre-
sumably of all other lateralized functions, occur by chance 
(p. 216).” One assumption pertaining to this hypothesis is that 
in the population of such subjects, all possible configurations 
of cognitive modules should be found.
Most subjects then with right hemisphere dominance 
for language show left-hemisphere lateralization for praxis; 
an uncommon dissociation the reason for which appears 
unknown.174 It is possible that evolutionarily such a disloca-
tion might have enabled accurate unimanual throwing whilst 
conversing with other group members. This hypothesis would 
suggest that language and visuospatial mechanisms would be 
parcellated into opposite hemispheres. Ninety-two percent of 
crossed aphasics showed evidence of this pattern.174 One sur-
vey of 73 left-handers with aphasia found that not one subject 
with right brain damage had limb apraxia.184 Other studies 
showed that 70% of left-handed subjects were left hemisphere 
dominant for language, 17% were right hemisphere dominant 
for linguistic functions and that only 13% were bilaterally 
represented.185 Finally good praxis/language studies of this 
nature should contain measures of: (i) handedness and limb 
praxis (ii) language localization and buccofacial praxis and 
(iii) visuospatial disorders and neglect.186
Finally, when comparing measures of handedness in 
women and men, the right-shift was found to be of greater 
magnitude in women.187 However, it is noteworthy that, to 
date, comprehensive quantitative trait loci (QTL) studies of Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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handedness have not been completed. Such studies have the 
potential to verify which gene(s) underlie handedness and 
hence linguistic/praxis dominance across the genders.187 
This feminine difference is congruent with the hypothesis 
that when the RS gene is absent (rs –) in women, there is a 
higher incidence of random lateralization, thereby precipitat-
ing a heightened propensity towards atypical, anomalous, or 
mirror symmetric localization. Conceivably, this might occur 
through expression of a recessive trait, perhaps implying 
a predominant maternal influence in eventual phenotypic 
expression of atypicality and in strong right hemisphere 
lateralization. Combined QTL and fMRI would perhaps be 
able to determine if atypicality is indeed associated with 
unique co-localization of cognitive functions.
“Resting state” functional 
lateralization in anomalous subjects
Since the mid-1990’s the right hemisphere has been hypoth-
esized to be the seat of insight.10 A summary of these early 
cognitive neuropsychological studies is important because 
these provided the theoretical basis for most functional 
neuroimaging insight studies, and its sister cousin intuition, 
conducted in recent years. Four direct parallels are acknowl-
edged between cognition in insight and the right hemisphere. 
These include: (1) reliance on nonverbal processes and 
neural networks; (2) avoidance of functional fixedness or 
perseveration; (3) access to either nondominant interpreta-
tions, larger semantic networks and/or topological similarity 
in concepts; and (4) perceptual restructuring.10 Our focus is 
on insight because (i) it is the more complex and is directly 
associated with eminent achievement and (ii) it has been 
neuropsychologically examined over a longer time period. 
Although; the right hemisphere is unambiguously dominant 
in insight and to a lesser extent intuitive processes we must 
stress that such differences are relative rather than absolute.188 
Both the left and right hemispheres are often, but not always, 
involved in both processes; however the right hemisphere 
has a dominant role.
Verbal overshadowing experiments confirmed the detri-
mental effects of verbalization on visual memory, visual image 
processing, and decision-making.189 Verbalization impaired 
subjects’ performance on insight, but not on logical prob-
lems,190 suggesting that insight relies more on nonreportable 
processes. Moreover, protocol analysis found argumentative 
structures in logical problems and frequent pauses and lack of 
articulation associated with insight problems.107 In a similar 
manner, “functional fixedness” describes a predisposition to 
use a tool or object to make a transitive action in a standard 
manner. In other words, the pre-potent action that an object 
affords is the dominant action, and not a nonstandard and 
novel action. However, subjects can learn to use an object 
in a nonstandard manner that is inconsistent with its more 
typical use, by overcoming the inherent functional fixedness 
ascribed to the object. Such cognitive biases persist despite 
insightful solutions that in hindsight, may appear simple, and 
may serve to block the participant’s search for alternative 
solution strategies.
Various concept formation tasks are related to insight 
problems. Patients with right anterior damage made more per-
severative errors than left anterior patients on the Wisconsin 
Card Sort test.191 Patients with right, but not left anterior 
temporal lesions, made more such errors.192 Patients with 
right hemisphere lesions made more perseverative errors;193 
as did those with right temporal lobe epileptic foci.194 Novel 
and nonobvious alternative solutions to insight problems 
appear to involve both the right frontal and right anterior 
temporal structures, with access to nondominant meanings 
of critical words often essential. In insight often alternative 
interpretations are modeled by “spreading activation” theo-
ries of memory retrieval.195 Participants who were unable 
to generate the correct word in a mini-insight problem, 
exhibited subconscious activation profiles to such an extent 
that the incorrect guess was nevertheless still related to 
the correct cue.196 Finally, the right anterior locus of both 
perseveration and access to nondominant meanings, are 
consistent with fMRI studies showing activation during 
memory retrieval.197 In addition to allowing for access to 
multiple meanings, there is evidence that the right hemisphere 
encodes meaning at a much broader and expansive level.50 
Left visual field presentations resulted in substantially more 
priming to distantly related words in a divided field paradigm 
than right visual field presentations.50 Similarly, the right 
hemisphere benefited more from interconceptual relations 
(eg, pear, plum) than from intraconceptual relations (eg, tree, 
roots).198 The left hemisphere referents were determined by 
logical/classificatory links, whereas right hemisphere ref-
erents were associated with situational links. Finally, in the 
left hemisphere there is rapid selection of one meaning and 
suppression of other candidate meanings, while activation 
spreads more diffusely and slowly within the distributed right 
hemispheric semantic network.199
Consonant with more diffuse activation within the right 
hemisphere, are findings that the left hemisphere contains 
more large pyramidal cells.200 These authors note that: 
“…even though both cell-column spacing and dendritic 
spread change in the same direction within the left hemi-Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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sphere, within language-associated regions, they do not 
change proportionally. Therefore, individual pyramidal cells 
in each hemisphere contact a different number of adjacent 
cell columns. In the left hemisphere, this asymmetry results 
in a smaller number of interconnected columns than in the 
right, and it has been suggested that this might indicate a 
more elaborate and less redundant pattern of local processing 
architecture in the left hemisphere… (p. 431).”201 The authors 
review ample contemporary neurobiological evidence which 
confirms that differing numbers of macrocolumnar systems, 
between the left and right hemispheres, allows for differently 
tuned systems, available to analyze information on a fine or 
coarse scale.
Perceptual restructuring is analogous to gestalt parallel 
recognition processes in which an object’s identity is suddenly 
perceived. There is a direct neuropsychological equivalent to 
perceptual restructuring. Integrative agnosia is a relatively rare 
disorder that occurs when a patient has difficulty integrating 
disparate elements of a display into a coherent singular gestalt 
form. In this sense, integrative agnosia is the opposite of what 
occurs during perceptual restructuring. In one of the most 
comprehensive studies of such patients, it was found that 5 of 
7 subjects demonstrated right hemisphere injury (3 of 7 right 
temporal); half were poor at figure-ground segregation; all were 
poor at discriminating overlapping figures; and most demon-
strated deficits in amodal completion; perception of illusory 
contours; and in grouping processes.202 Perceptual restructuring 
in insight has been shown to be analogous to such perceptual 
pattern recognition processes.107 Scholastic Aptitude Test and 11 
other potential correlates of successful insight problem solving 
were analyzed and only object contour drawings and the Embed-
ded Figures Test (EFT)203 were highly significant predictors.202 
Concurrent verbalization while solving the EFT impaired the 
ability to make such correct perceptual identifications.10
There are good reasons to suspect that the habitual pro-
cessing mode of the right hemisphere is fundamentally dif-
ferent from that of the left.188 Considerable evidence points to 
right hemisphere superiority at: imagery,204 paradigmatic,205 
simultaneous,206 global,207 coordinate,208 parallel,209 and 
holistic11 processing.210 Baynes and Gazzaniga’s discussion 
of the left hemisphere “interpreter” also highlights the situ-
ational interpretation superiority of the right hemisphere in 
split-brain patients.211 Whether similar mechanisms exist 
in the normal right hemisphere or for that matter in right 
hemisphere language dominant subjects is open to debate. 
The interpreter then seeks explanations for why events 
occur in a “make it up as we go along” manner; whereas 
the right hemisphere demonstrates an acute awareness for 
more disparate contextual factors, affective reactions as these 
relate to self.”211
The difficulty then is determining just what the functions 
of this right hemisphere are compared to that of this logico-
grammatical interpreter of the left hemisphere? Since most 
normal subjects do not have well-developed linguistic func-
tions in the right hemisphere it is difficult to ascertain just 
what exactly the right hemisphere is doing compared with the 
left hemisphere interpreter. Indeed as Baynes and Gazzaniga 
note; philosopher of consciousness Daniel Dennett’s practi-
cal comments on this issue by suggesting that researchers 
“...accurately assess the upper extent of [right hemisphere] 
cognitive function... (p. 1355).”211 Incidentally, hints into 
insight problems, presented to the right hemisphere, were 
solved better.10 The right hemisphere advantage interacted 
with a delay, such that the hint effect was substantially larger 
when individuals were working on the problem unsuccess-
fully for at least two minutes.10 Collectively, this suggests that 
right hemisphere processes are particularly apt to be involved 
in insight problem-solving, when individuals are stuck in set. 
The right hemisphere is involved in insight problem-solving, 
through avoidance of perseveration, access to nondominant 
meaning and longer-term “problem-finding”.
Relatedly, positive mood has been found to alter pre-
paratory activity within the dorsal anterior cingulate and 
right angular gyrus and thereby bias participants to engage 
in processing favorable to insight as opposed to analytical 
problem solving.212 Positive affect tips the balance towards 
global as opposed to local foci of attention213 and towards 
broader attention to either external visual space or internal 
conceptual space.214 Positive affect appears to heighten 
solvers’ sensitivity to right hemispheric semantic process-
ing, in conjunction with a frontal-mediated cognitive control 
network presumably involved in problem restructuring. 
Recent work on functional lateralization has emphasized the 
importance of whole hemisphere level coordinative functions 
of top-down frontal mediated brain networks215 purportedly 
involved in the development of right hemisphere language 
dominance. As an example, the anterior cingulate is involved 
in overcoming pre-potent responses when conflict is high and 
strategic processes are less engaged216 and the right angular 
gyrus is involved in spatial attention.217 This right hemispheric 
network appears to function in the de-selection of pre-potent 
responses, restructuring of the solution relevant activations 
and biasing responses towards global internal and/or external 
attentional loci.
Resting state EGG activity was compared between sub-
jects classified as high insight or low insight using solution Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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rates to anagrams.218,219 Few studies have tested the hypoth-
esis that individuals differ on a factor such as lateralization 
of function, with the exception of spontaneous undirected 
thought.220 An EEG study found that alpha band activity 
distinguished between individuals with high verbal aptitude 
and those with high nonverbal aptitude.221 Verbalizers made 
greater use of the left parietal regions, whereas nonverbal 
strategizers made greater use of the right parietal lobe. 
Correlational analyses supported the position that insight 
self-reports actually reflected differential use of problem 
solving strategies, and there was greater bilateral occipital 
beta (13–18 Hz) indicative of more focused visual attention 
for low insight subjects.218,219 Hence individual differences 
in resting state brain activity directly influenced the neural 
computations associated with insight and this finding is 
consistent with a diffuse attention mode of highly creative 
individuals.222 Greater low alpha at right dorsal-frontal, 
beta and gamma at right inferior frontal, as well as greater 
gamma at right parietal was consistent with right functional 
lateralization in high insight subjects.218,219
Discourse processes, that place a premium on computing 
distant semantic relations, are particularly apt to result in 
increases in neural activity within the right temporal lobe,223 
and especially in right anterior-superior temporal lobe.224 
Therefore, the nonverbal nature of intuition and insight sug-
gests a “building block” relationship between the constructs. 
Intuitive and insightful processes could be used preferentially 
and habitually, as a function of the fact that they are the 
preferred cognitive modes for the individual. However, on 
closer examination, the preferred cognitive mode scenario 
usually arises as an indirect developmental consequence of 
specific ability endowment, such as verbal, nonverbal, or 
spatial second-order factors of intelligence.225 Alternatively, 
preferred cognitive mode could be determined by functional 
lateralization indices.177,226–228
Our focus now turns to this developmental hypothesis of the 
origins of right hemisphere language. Performance on covert 
visual orientating which is a measure of attentional asym-
metry,229 and the Raven standard progressive matrices230 was 
correlated.231 High asymmetry was negatively correlated with 
the sine que non measure of fluid intelligence, as measured 
by the Raven. Similarly an ear advantage in either direction in 
sinistrals, was associated with lower Object Assembly scores 
on the WAIS.232 And more specifically, the achievement-ability 
domain scores on the Medical College Admission Test were 
correlated with gender and handedness.233 Right hemisphere 
dominance was associated with intellectual giftedness in verbal 
reasoning and these right-handed individuals scored higher 
on writing indices. Superior intelligence was associated with 
stronger recruitment of the bilateral posterior parietal cortex.234 
High IQ has also been associated with bilateral parietal 
integrity,235 which re-directs us to the question of the func-
tional relationship between bilateral frontoparietal networks, 
and the posited ventral right semantic stream associated with 
intuition and insight.
IQ achievement discrepancy 
and anomalous subjects
In order to find subjects with strong asymmetry in the direc-
tion of the right hemisphere, with little or no bilateralism 
of functions, large samples of several hundred subjects are 
required to be sifted through. This search requires that a 
preliminary method of determining functional lateralization 
that is cheap and efficient be available. FMRI and PET are 
too expensive for preliminary first round searches unless the 
data is associated with a few of the world’s largest functional 
neuroimaging centers. Even at these centers finding atypi-
cal subjects may be difficult since the data may have been 
collected over decades making it difficult to track down 
subjects. Also many imaging protocols have not used full 
brain scans. Functional transcranial doppler sonography or 
fTCD has been validated in conjunction with intracarotid 
amobarbitol injection, or the WADA procedure,226 as well 
as fMRI236 for determining the direction and degree of func-
tional lateralization of cognitive functions. Functional TCD 
constitutes a noninvasive, cheap, quick, and reliable method 
of determining lateralization in large samples.
Archival fMRI data collected at the Massachusetts 
General Hospital Functional Neuroimaging Center identi-
fied several strongly right hemisphere dominant subjects.7 
These investigators conducted neuropsychological examina-
tion of three subjects all of whom happened to be female. 
A difference in favor of performance IQ versus verbal IQ 
was found in all three subjects without any history of con-
founding neurological illness. The investigators noted that 
in the past the vast majority of patients studied with right 
hemisphere language had a pre-existing neuropathology. 
These authors advocated further study in the area, par-
ticularly in right hemisphere language dominant women, 
since most studies have examined ostensibly neurologically 
pathological individuals.7 In the Chee and Caplan study, it 
was noted that both verbal and performance scales were in 
the normal range for all three healthy subjects.7 The authors 
also observed that a complete mirror reversal of cognitive 
functions occurs in at least a subset of subjects; what this 
means in terms of adaptive functioning per se is not yet Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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completely understood. Interestingly, the three female 
subjects studied were professionals or were employed in 
skilled occupations, requiring high levels of education and 
advanced post-secondary training. A complete reversal of 
language and face encoding was found in subject 1, and 
partial reversal of these functions in subjects 2 and 3. The 
dislocation of language and face encoding in one subject, 
and the co-location of face encoding and language in two 
subjects, provides ambiguous data in reference to the valid-
ity of the crowding hypothesis. Z-scores were calculated 
and pooled across for subjects 2 and 3. The differences in 
subject 3 in terms of VIQ and PIQ could be interpreted as 
some support for the crowding hypothesis.7,37 In fact the 
z-scores for subjects 2 and 3, with incomplete reversal of 
cognitive functioning, show that when IQ is constant, the 
only definitive conclusion is that the individuals demon-
strated superior Block Design scores, which in contrary to 
the ‘crowding hypothesis’. All individuals were presumed of 
superior intellectual ability, given advanced postsecondary 
achievement indicators (Table 1).
Table 1 shows that in partial mirror reversal of 
lateralization, there was better performance on the Block 
Design subtest of the WAIS-R when compared with that 
patient with complete mirror reversal. Block Design is gener-
ally considered the best measure of visuospatial perceptual 
organization in the Wechsler scales,238 and lesions of the 
parietal lobes are most prone to result in reliable decre-
ments in performance on this scale.235 Since performance 
was greater in subjects with incomplete mirror reversal, in 
spite of approximately equivalent performance on the VIQ, 
Table  Comparison of complete versus partial reversal of cognitive functions in atypical language lateralization subjects. 
Copyright © 2001.   Adapted and reprinted with permission of Lippincott, williams & wilkins, Ltd. from Chee MwL, Caplan D. Face 
encoding and psychometric testing in healthy dextral with right hemisphere language. Neurology. 59(12):1928–1934
Subject Subject  Subject  Subject   and  Z-score
variables average difference versus x + 
Age 23 25 24 25 –
Gender Female Female Female Female –
educ College High school College College –
Hand +23/24 (R) +9/24 (R) +19/24 (R) +14/24 (R) 0.38
Face encod +0.44/1.00 +0.08/1.00 +0.05/1.00 +0.07/1.00 0.44
word encod −0.96/1.00 −1.00/1.00 −0.70/1.00 −0.85/1.00 0.11
Mirror Rev Complete Partial Partial Partial –
wAiS FSiQ z = +0.46 z = −0.20 z = +1.07 z = +0.44 –
wAiS viQ z = +0.20 z = −0.67 z = +0.27 z = −0.20 –
wAiS PiQ z = +0.93 z = +0.53 z = +1.93 z = +1.23 –
wAiS BD z = 0.00 z = +1.67 z = +3.00 z = +2.34 . P  0.0
wAiS DS z = +1.67 z = +1.33 z = +2.00 z = +1.67 –
word Mem z = +1.30 z = +1.30 z = +1.30 z = +1.30 –
Face Mem z = +0.30 z = 0.00 z = +0.50 z = 0.25 –
imm Rec vs z = +0.70 z = +1.70 z = +1.70 z = +1.70 –
Del Rec vs z = +1.10 z = +2.50 z = +2.50 z = +2.50 .0 P  0.0
imm Rec ve z = +0.60 z = 0.00 z = +0.30 z = +0.15 –
Del Rec ve z = +0.20 z = +0.20 z = +0.70 z = +0.45 –
vis Mem i z = +1.33 z = +0.87 z = +0.07 z = +0.47 –
ver Mem i z = +0.60 z = −0.13 z = +0.13 z = 0.00 –
ROFR z = +1.86 z = +0.64 z = +0.79 z = +0.72 –
Notes: Bold type indicates potential statistical differences. On the frontal face encoding and the frontal word encoding a positive value denoted left hemispheric dominance 
and a negative value denotes right hemispheric dominance.
Abbreviations: educ, education; Hand, handedness; Face encod, frontal face encoding;   word encod, frontal word encoding; Mirror Rev, mirror reversal;   wAiS, wechsler Adult 
intelligence Scale–Revised;    viQ, verbal iQ; PiQ, performance iQ; BD, block design; DS, digit symbol;   word Mem, word memory;   wRMT,   warrington Recognition Memory  Test; Face 
Mem, face memory; imm Rec vs, immediate recall (visual); Del Rec vs, delayed recall (visual); imm Rec ve, immediate recall (verbal); Del Rec ve, delayed recall (verbal);   vis Mem i, 
visual memory index;   ver Mem i, verbal memory index; RORF, Rey-Osterrieth Figure Recall.Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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PIQ, and FSIQ, the findings are congruent with the assertion 
that crowding is not by any means the norm among these 
subjects. Usually right lateralization is found for spatial 
attention,239 and sometimes neglect is found after left hemi-
sphere lesions in select subjects.240 No differences in verbal 
fluency or line bisection performance were found between 
the left and right hemispheres of atypically localized subjects 
when compared with those of normal lateralization pattern 
subjects.8 Unfortunately this sample recruited preferentially 
nonright-handers, unlike the Chee and Caplan study,7 and 
this added additional complexity to the interpretation of their 
results.8 However, a secondary analysis assists in clarification 
of the mechanisms operating within these data. Table 2 shows 
that among right-handers, there was a greater number of males 
with complete mirror reversal and those members exhibited a 
greater degree of mirror reversal. Whether this pattern holds 
for larger samples would depend upon an analysis of more 
right hemisphere dominant dextrals (Table 2).
Further analysis of the subset (n = 4/10) with incom-
plete mirror reversal, may help clarify this pattern of 
results found among the largest subset of subjects with 
demonstrated unambiguous right hemisphere language. 
To this end then, the short form of the German IQ test 
(Leistungsprufensystem [LPS]) for adults aged less than 
50 years, was used to test general intellectual functioning.241 
The detailed study revealed that two medical students, 
a teacher, and a business consultant scored within the first 
standard deviation unit on an equivalent WAIS-R FSIQ 
measure which is surprisingly low. One female medical 
student who was right-handed, scored highest on LPS 
reasoning as well as on the degree of right hemispheric 
language lateralization. The superior achievement indices 
of physician, business person, and teacher suggest that these 
unique subjects possess a type of cognitive advantage in 
a specific ability as opposed to that of IQ.242 Collectively, 
these findings contradict the crowding hypothesis but do 
point to the puzzlingly low FSIQ indices in some subjects. 
Finally, in the earlier study by Knecht and colleagues, 
upon which this study was based, in a atypically localized 
sample of subjects (n = 21 of 326), no correlation was 
found between FSIQ and language lateralization.227 Across 
the full-range of laterality indices, one striking finding was 
that a subject with the most extreme rightward lateraliza-
tion index, also scored highest with an IQ of greater than 
150. The latter finding suggests that aptitude-achievement 
discrepancies are not necessarily the norm, in such 
atypical subjects, but rather could involve more complex 
factors (eg, co-association or compensatory development 
of alternative specific abilities or capacities). However, 
it is becoming increasingly clear that atypical language 
dominance is not by any means intrinsically pathological as 
(i) classical neurolinguistic theory (ii) conventional clinical 
neuropsychological wisdom or (iii) older empirical studies 
would suggest (Table 3).
Communicative superiority  
and functional lateralization?
These early descriptive and qualitative studies constitute 
very small samples however these are nonetheless quite 
provocative. The functional significance of these atypi-
cal and anomalous subjects’ patterns of laterality is still 
largely unclear. Knecht and colleagues conducted an 
elegant functional MRI study of seven left hemisphere and 
seven right hemisphere language dominant subjects.228 A 
uniform and reliable finding was that there was no evidence 
of increased bilaterality of linguistic functions in right 
hemisphere-dominant (RHD) subjects. More telling was 
that no more variability was found in the loci of activation in 
RHD subjects. The last conclusion is significant since it runs 
contrary to several developmental psychopathology accounts 
of the origins of extreme RHD.243 In other words, the two 
patterns of spatial topography of hemispheric activation, 
were completely mirror symmetric. Similarly, there was no 
evidence of the compensatory bilateral activation that might 
be expected on the basis of studies of early injury to cortical 
or mixed cortical/subcortical regions.
When flipping the activation patterns for left hemisphere-
dominant (LHD) and RHD and using comparisons, no 
differences in either the first or second fMRI activation 
profiles were found, which are results that supported the 
Table  Handedness and frequencies of demographic, lateralization 
and performance parameters8
Demographics and tests Left-handers Right-handers
Age 26 27
Number (n = 7) 70% (n = 3) 30%
Gender 43% Male % Male
Handedness −72 +74
Language lateralization −3.49 −3.37
Attentional lateralization +0.83 +1.07
Complete mirror reversal 57% %
Verbal fluency z = +1.82 z = +2.38
Line bisection z = +0.02 z = +0.15
Notes: Bold type indicates potential statistical differences. Positive values for language 
and attentional lateralization denote left hemispheric dominance whereas negative 
values denote right hemispheric dominance.Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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mirror hypothesis, at least for healthy normal RHD subjects. 
In fact, for strongly RHD subjects there was greater right 
lateralization of linguistic processes than was found for 
leftward lateralization in LHD subjects! Finally, the review 
by Woods and colleagues suggests that complete shifts of 
cerebral lateralization only occur after early and extensive 
cortical and noncortical structural or functional lesions.243 
Such a pathological hypothesis and hence pattern would 
be expected to be associated with spatially disorganized 
mapping. However, the subjects in this study exhibited nor-
mal structural and functional MRI scans, as well as normal 
mirror symmetry. Since the 14 subjects were recruited from 
a consecutive normal population sample of 326, the findings 
were interpreted by the European Munster Functional Imag-
ing Study group as strong evidence against the early pathol-
ogy account of RHD.
Developmental neuropsychological studies are of a 
similar opinion that anomalous patterns are determined 
genetically and may arise in the uterine environment.244 
Recent studies examined, not only the typicality of linguistic 
lateralization in right hemisphere dominant individuals, but 
also the theoretically important issue of the co-dominance 
patterns of association in these rare subjects. Floel and 
colleagues’ study was among the first to examine the spatial 
topography, hemisphericity, and intrahemispheric activation 
pattern of spatial attention in RHD.5 The left intrahemi-
spheric activation pattern for spatial attention was found 
homotopic, with regular spatial topography of activation 
for right hemisphere dominant spatial attention processes! 
Secondly, the authors discovered that in RH co-dominance 
subjects, the pattern of spatial attentional activation did not 
differ from subjects with right hemisphere dominance for 
Table  Handedness and frequencies of demographics, lateralization and performance parameters for 4 subjects with incomplete mirror 
reversal. Copyright © 2001.   Adapted and reprinted with permission of Lippincott, williams &  wilkins, Ltd. From Floel A, Knecht S, Lohmann H, 
et al. Language and spatial attention can lateralize to the same hemisphere in healthy humans. Neurology. 2001; 57:1018–1024
Demographics Subject  Subject  Subject  Subject  Average and tests
FSiQ z = +0.60 z = +0.40 z = +0.50 z = +0.60 z = +0.53
Occupation Medical student Business consultant Teacher Medical Student
Age 25 32 28 23 27
Gender M F F F 75% F
Handedness −30 (L) −100 (L) −23 (L) + (R)  75% LH
Lang. Lat. −1.73 (R) −3.06 (R) −3.36 (R) −4.13 (R) −3.07 (R)
Att. Lat. −1.71 (R) −2.78 (R) −3.20 (R) −2.86 (R) −2.64 (R)
incomplete Mirror R. √ √ √ √ All Subjects
verbal Fluency z = +2.29 z = +1.26 z = +1.92 z = +2.48 z = +2.01
Line Bisection z = +0.02 z = −0.54 z = +0.02 z = -1.96 z = −0.67
LPS  v.K. z = 0.00 z = 0.00 z = +0.50 z = 0.00 z = +0.13
LPS Reasoning z = +1.00 z = 0.00 z = +1.00 z = +1.30 z = +0.83
LPS w.F. z = +1.30 z = +0.50 z = +0.50 z = +1.30 z = +0.90
LPS v.P. z = +0.50 z = +0.50 z = 0.00 z = +0.50 z = +0.38
LPS Figure-Ground z = +0.50 z = +1.00 z = +0.50 z = +1.30 z = +0.83
LPS Flex. of Closure z = +0.50 z = +0.50 z = +0.50 z = +0.00 z = +0.38
wAiS-R D.S. z = −0.70 z = 0.00 z = -.00 z = +0.20 z = −0.38
Corsi Block Span z = +0.50 z = +0.50 z = -0.0 z = +0.20 z = +0.13
Trail-Making A/B z = +1.30 z = +0.70 z = -0.0 z = +1.30 z = +0.78
Speed/Accuracy z = +0.70 z = +1.40 z = +0.0 z = +1.60 z = +1.05
Finger Tapping (RH) – +2.78 LH +.0 LH +2.86 LH  +2.21(LH)
eeG Scan Normal Normal Normal Normal All normal
Note: Bold type indicates potential statistical differences.
Abbreviations: FSiQ, Leistungsprufsystem (LPS) Full-Scale iQ; Lang. Lat., Language Lateralization;   Att. Lat.,   Attentional Lateralization; incomplete Mirror R., incomplete 
Mirror Reversal; LPS v.K., LPS verbal Knowledge; LPS w.F., LPS word Fluency; LPS v.P., LPS visual Perception; LPS Figure-Ground, LPS Figure-Background Perception; LPS Flex. 
of Closure, LPS Flexibility of Closure;   wAiS-R D.S., wechsler Adult intelligence Scale – Revised Digit Span Subtest; Corsi Block Span, Corsi Block Tapping Span; Trail-Making 
A/B, Trail-Making Test Part A (Cognitive Speed) and TMT Part B (Mental Flexibility) Combined Score; Speed-Accuracy, Concentration: Speed/ Accuracy d2 test; Finger Tapping 
(RH), Finger Tapping Praxis Localization using the Right Hand.Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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only spatial attention or language! Finally, it was observed 
that RH co-dominance subjects in the study had no appre-
ciable impairment in cognitive functioning. Consistent with 
the spatial topography of intrahemispheric RH language, 
the results suggest that it is the “intrahemispheric pattern”, 
rather than the hemispheric side per se, that appears to be a 
hardwired pattern of brain organization. These convergent 
finding contradicts the leftward language acquisition device 
doctrine.4
Practical applications of intuition 
and insight
Perhaps there are no more requirements for practical appli-
cation of intuition and insight than in clinical psychological 
interviewing and assessment. An interesting example of 
how intuition and insight can be integrated is in the use 
of projective drawings to examine personality constructs. 
These sensitive projective tests can also be used to assess 
more distantly related psychodynamic defense mechanisms 
in patients and clients. Projective drawings such as the 
House–Tree–Person have been used in psychodiagnostics 
for well over 60 years245–247 and can be used for evaluation 
of psychopathology as well as evaluation of positive aspects 
of adaptation. Extensive normative and empirical studies are 
available for all ages and types of diagnosis. Patients are 
asked to draw a house, a tree, and a person in succession in 
an open-ended format and then the drawings are rigorously 
analyzed and scored for various specific test signs and 
“constellations of signs” usually taken to be indicative of a 
syndrome. This requires keen observation of the drawings 
in the context of the referral question, clinical history, other 
test results and the clinical interview. This is the epitomy of 
practical intuition of what fits and what does not fit into a 
clinical picture using a type of “semantic gestalt.”
The three drawings depicted below were drawn by three 
separate adults. Usually patients will draw the full set of three 
drawings which each can be scored individually and then 
similarities in clinical themes across the three drawings can 
then be used to extrapolate “a configuration of signs”. In the 
case of drawing A the house is unrecognizable and consists 
of what looks like a vague floor-plan with logical errors of 
missing walls and many mis-proportioned segments. These 
signs are symptomatic of organic brain damage and indeed 
drawing A was drawn by an adult with severe brain dam-
age. Drawing B depicts two trees drawn in response to the 
request to draw a tree. The shapes of the trees are decidedly 
masculine, depicted in a barren environment. The bimodal 
themes of hills and trees suggest dependency needs in addi-
tion to the over-compliance. Drawing C is a depiction of an 
individual with an extremely distorted body image, with the 
overall gestalt lines surrounding the face missing and with 
the macabre instance of intestines spilling out of the figure’s 
abdomen. This drawing was done by a patient in the throes 
of an acute schizophrenic episode (Figure 8).
However we must emphasize that in recent years projec-
tive drawings have also been used to study factors associated 
with resiliency, normal adaptation, and positive features of 
personalities. One particularly excellent way to teach intuition 
A: House B: Tree C: Person
Figure  Projective drawings and personality inventory assessment as concordant examples of the relationship between intuition and insight in clinical psychology.   Traditionally 
these projective tests have been used to characterize pathology but increasingly they are also being used to study normal developmental processes and healthy adaptation as in 
the positive psychology movement. Drawings are particularly apt to tap right hemispheric processes and notions of self,238 psychodynamic processes,245–247 and as hypothesized 
in this article links between conscious and unconscious mind. Copyright © 1997. From eH Hammer, Advances in Projective Drawing interpretation, 1997. Courtesy of Charles 
C.Thomas Publisher, Ltd., Springfield, Illinois. Drawing A is adapted from Figure 2–26 on page 34. Drawing B is adapted from Figure 5–7 on page 96. Drawing C is adapted from 
Figure 2–16 on page 25.Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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to clinical psychology residents in the art of projectives is 
to ask the clinician to first get the patient to do the three sets 
of drawings. Then the individual drawings are scored for the 
separate House, Tree, and Person criteria. A thematic analysis 
of trends appearing across the three sets of drawings can then 
be extracted with usually a summary three line statement 
about personality structure and any salient defences latent in 
the drawings. This entire process in rich in projective intuitive 
interpretation. Note that during the course of the interview 
and subsequent formal testing the patient is usually asked to 
complete a standard personality inventory after the drawings: 
an objective personality test. Once the drawing summary is 
complete the clinician scores the personality inventory and 
looks at the degree of concordance between the subjective 
drawing summary and the objective personality profile. Cor-
relation of drawings with standardized personality tests has 
been used as a clinical skill development technique since the 
1960s.275 This “secondary insight-based process” is helpful 
in developing a diagnosis and case conceptualization for the 
client or patient in the context of referral question, clinical 
history, interview and the results of other standardized test-
ing. Patient A would be expected to have a generally “flat 
profile” on the personality scales due to blunting of cognitive 
functions and general cognitive decline. Patient B would 
show elevations on measures indicative of dependency and 
Patient C would be expected to show elevations on somatiza-
tion and thought disorder scales. Hence the entire process 
consists of two stages. Stage 1 involves a detailed analysis 
of the drawings in the context of objective scoring criteria 
and clinical intuition. Stage 2 involves an insight process 
that is more reflective in that the clinician takes all of the 
clinical information about the patient into consideration in 
formulating a tentative diagnosis, case conceptualization 
and treatment plan.
Discussion
In the last five years significant theoretical and empirical 
developments have advanced the understanding of behavioral, 
cognitive, and neuropsychological correlates and precursors 
of intuition and insight. Intuition is the ability to understand 
something immediately without need for conscious thought; 
whereas, insight is the capacity to gain an accurate and deep 
intuitive understanding of something. In popular culture, a link 
between the concepts has been alluded to. Now, however there 
are emerging case studies and cognitive and neural research 
results that add weight to the notion that the two concepts can 
be considered more sister cousins than orthogonal constructs. 
There are reliable individual differences found in insight 
and these differences have been associated with perception 
of relations and fluency;248 fluid intelligence;249 and spatial 
working memory.250 Similarly, individuals have been found to 
vary in intuitive acumen. Differences in nonverbal decoding 
appear central to most definitions of intuition and they have 
been recorded across a wide variety of study methodolo-
gies.114 Arguably, intuition often results in decisions that are 
as good or better than those arising from conscious delib-
eration, perhaps due in part to its structural properties.30,190 
Intuition has been found central to cognitive processes 
such as heuristic-based decision-making,251 creativity,17 
and learning.25 The concept intuition has been correlated 
with successful and gifted performance in the practice of 
medicine and has been particularly associated with superior 
clinical decision-making.252 Intuition has been a utilized as a 
construct to explain success in many professions,253 including 
specific fields such as nursing254 and business management.255 
Similarly, using the great minds approach, superior insight 
has been demonstrated to be pivotal to eminent achievement 
in many domains.36
To reiterate, intuition is automatic, nonconscious, affec-
tively laden, absolute and judgmental, instant, implicit, 
associated with motor response, and the operation of right 
hemisphere nonverbal decoding mechanisms. In contrast, 
insight is effortful, conscious, affectively laden only at the 
moment of restructuring; nonabsolute and nonjudgmental, 
potentially occurring over longer time spans, declarative, 
associated with propositional reasoning, and like intuition 
with the operation of neural substrates in the right hemisphere. 
Whereas, intuition is associated with the control of expertise 
and automatized knowledge within basal ganglia and orbi-
tofrontal networks, insight is associated with cognitive 
functions in knowledge-lean domains, restructuring within 
the right temporal lobe, and acting in conjunction with fron-
toparietal networks. It is interesting in this context that the 
first quantitative morphometric studies of right-hemisphere 
language dominant subjects only show greater grey matter 
volume in the right hippocampus.256 This is consistent with 
an emerging view that laterality of language localization is 
a function of maturation of the “what” ventral stream.
While intuition is associated with a single iterative 
stage, insight is characterized by the four progressive 
stages of preparation, incubation, insight and elaboration. 
Functionally and neurally, intuition is closely associated 
with the development of expertise, heuristics and affective 
gists during the preparation and incubation stages. The 
caudate and the orbitofrontal cortex are likely the means 
through which the two functional neuroanatomical systems Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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interface and computationally interact. Moreover, it appears 
that intuition usurps declarative knowledge systems once 
implicit understandings become routinized and automatic 
via the striatum. Therefore, most perceptual restructuring 
that occurs during insights’ “eureka” or “aha” moments are 
a function of subconscious transformation of informationally 
rich chunks or models. These chunks or intuitive schemas 
or models have a high throughput band-width which allows 
for coding vast amounts of information that may be easily 
modified in the future.
There is anecdotal, empirical, and neurophysiological 
evidence demonstrating a female advantage on intuitive type 
tasks involving nonverbal decoding. Also, self-knowledge 
systems and emotional appraisal are dependent upon effec-
tive interaction between basal ganglia and limbic neural 
networks, thereby demonstrating that self-perception is not 
completely reliant on declarative memory. Similarly, neu-
ropragmatic tasks like determination of the order of events 
in social episodes are reliant on right orbitofrontal systems. 
Other pragmatic aspects of language such as mentalizing or 
theory of mind (right temporoparietal);257,258 inhibition of 
one’s own experience during the consideration of another’s 
state of mind (right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex);259 self-
recognition (right lateral prefrontal cortex);260 metaphoric 
figurative language;261 and indirect requests10 are similarly 
dependent on both posterior and anterior right hemispheric 
networks. Thus, intuition is, in a real sense, primary to insight 
in terms of the functional interaction of the two highly com-
plex interdependent novel problem solving systems.
Since the right hemisphere is superior at imagery,204 
global,207 coordinate,208 and situational as opposed to inter-
pretive functions;211 intuition and insight in right hemisphere 
dominant subjects could give rise to “emergent properties.” 
Utilizing functional transcranial doppler, a European research 
consortium tested hundreds of subjects for linguistic and 
spatial localization across the hemispheres.228 Several dozen 
female and male subjects, exhibiting extreme levels of right 
hemisphere language localization were discovered, and 
interestingly, the magnitude of rightward lateralization was 
greater than that of leftward lateralization. There was little 
concordance with the crowding hypothesis, which would 
have predicted that all subjects have co-extensive spatial 
and constructional praxis skills in the right linguistic hemi-
sphere. Moreover, subsequent case studies of a cohort of the 
individuals, many of whom were female, confirmed superior 
achievement on measures of occupational attainment. This 
superior achievement was in the context of having recorded 
mediocre scores on conventionally measured IQ test. 
The results show gender differences in specific functions as 
well as perhaps application of gender-specific psychometric 
testing protocols.
Finally Floel and colleagues’ study of two healthy normal 
female subjects showed language and spatial functions 
lateralizing within the right hemisphere using fMRI5 with 
no adverse effects on cognitive functioning confirming 
the co-extensivity hypothesis.12,13 Similarly a 29-year-old 
right-handed male student demonstrated total lateralization 
reversal as measured by abstract/concrete word decisions with 
visually and auditory presented words.6 The same pattern was 
found with a visual word generation task and notably cortical 
and cerebellar foci were mirror symmetric. Since this male sub-
ject had no history of brain damage the authors hypothesized 
that this pattern of brain organization was present from an early 
age and likely determined genetically. Concordant with this 
hypothesis, complementary frontocerebellar crossed functions 
in both left and right language dominant subjects, implies early 
maturing subcortical influences on the eventual manifestation 
of hemisphericity for linguistic and spatial processes.6 Hence, 
the documentation of co-extensivity of language and spatial 
processes, as well as unique co-configurations of modules in 
an unexpected hemisphere, without the necessity of crowding 
or attenuation of general cognitive functioning, does suggest 
that emergent cognitive functions is a possibility. That is 
language and spatial functions could interact in a single 
hemisphere in real-time with broad affects on the qualitative 
aspects of cognition that would not be present in normally 
brain organized subjects.
It is hypothesized that the achievement-ability discrep-
ancies are congruent with speculation that the “functional 
capacity” of the subjects often exceeds their measured intel-
ligence level. Incidentally, Colom and colleagues found that 
a right hemispheric network comprising right superior frontal 
gyrus and right inferior parietal lobule gray matter volume 
explained most of the variation on measures of working 
memory capacity in a large sample of individuals within the 
normal range of intelligence.262 Arguably, such individuals 
perform exceptionally well in intellectually demanding 
environments because, in addition to the regular cadre of 
cognitive abilities associated with typically localized sub-
jects, the anomalous individuals possess emergent cognitive 
specializations that normal individuals either do not possess, 
or do not possess in abundance. The ‘emergent properties’ are 
hypothesized to be intuition, insight and social competence 
(and various permutations of these abilities in combination 
with semantic processing and motor responding), or perhaps 
“prefrontal-cerebellar inverse modeling mechanisms.”263Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 0
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A prefrontal-cerebellar inverse modeling mechanism 
could provide for the highly accurate mapping of semantic 
markers and related action concepts to visual gestures by 
recursive and iterative feedback occurring over ontogeny.263 
It is hypothesized that this would amount to a much more 
articulate description of categories of human social inter-
action variables at a high degree of abstraction.264 As an 
example universals in sound-shape cross-domain mapping 
regardless of language, alphabet, or culture suggests that 
the brain may be similarly involved in extracting a common 
denominator between vision and movement265 and could 
be analogous to a semantic conceptual synaesthesia.266 
A hardwired “crosslinguistic fluency” would aid in disper-
sal evolutionarily through cooperative behavior and might 
explain high general IQ249 and spatial IQ250 loadings. This 
would be akin to a tower of Babel effect. Unusual co-local-
ization of language, emotion, and abstract semantics in 
the right hemisphere, while object-orientated actions and 
visuospatial functions reside in the left hemisphere could 
result in the developmental acquisition of emergent proper-
ties. In particular, the sequestration of praxis and concrete 
concepts to the left hemisphere could function as a superior 
signal-to-noise mapping mechanism, in concert with the 
right hemisphere’s abstract linguistic mapping function.267 
With this interpretation, the neuropsychological constructs 
of intuition and insight would be seen at the core of any 
popularized notion of ‘emotional intelligence’.
The speculation that unique co-localization of cognitive 
modules, within a hemisphere, could developmentally confer 
a higher-order sociocognitive function specialization has been 
considered. In particular, the progression in theory of mind 
development and its hypothesized core role in virtually all 
aspects of the elaboration of normal higher-order sociocog-
nitive functioning,268 as well as its dependence generally on 
advances in frontal-mediated inhibitory control,269 is telling. 
Such posteriorly located core theory of mind and biological 
motion detection networks within the right hemisphere must 
develop coherence while under the influence of prefrontal 
long-range connections.270 To test such a supposition however 
would require a systematic identification of subjects and a 
comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation longitudi-
nally. Additionally, structural and functional neuroimaging 
would be required, as well as a cognitive neuropsychologi-
cal analysis of each individual and the group as a whole. 
This approach would benefit from effective and functional 
connectivity studies to assist in determining if there were 
preferential cognitive processing modes associated with 
intuition and insight.
In summary intuition and insight, in close agreement with 
the connotation used by the general public and layman, are 
real psychological constructs at the upper end of complexity 
in the social cognition scale. Actual human performance is 
likely to consist of lengthy periods of didactic novice–expert 
learning of a skill which then becomes routinized and auto-
matic, and is associated with intuition through a domain of 
knowledge. Similarly, insight is periodically associated with 
major conceptual transitions within a specific domain of 
knowledge, and it is punctuated by a regular and normally 
laborious series of propositional reasoning steps, followed 
by elaboration. Finally, automatic and subconscious intuitive 
knowledge feeds into the incubation stage of insight where 
rich informational chunks are restructured into new under-
standings. Verbal comprehension and propositional reasoning 
are examples that demonstrate not all processes associated 
with intuition and insight are necessarily right hemispheric 
in origin. Intuition and insight are theoretically well-defined 
from both a sociocognitive and neural perspective. However, 
what is required are comprehensive neuropsychological 
studies directed at determination of the upper performance 
limits of such functions. Similarly, an understanding of 
how superior intuition and insight arise over the course of 
development are nonexistent. As well, further examination 
of the relationship between intuition and insight to that of 
other psychometric constructs, such as spatial visualization 
and general intelligence, are necessary for complete under-
standing of the area. Finally, improved measures of these 
constructs in regards to complex social and novel problem 
solving, are needed.
Conclusions
The neuropsychological study of right hemisphere 
language functions has been until very recently been plagued 
by convoluted misinformation, unquestioned and antiquated 
assumptions and poorly designed research to examine 
functions of the right hemisphere in neurologically normal 
human subjects. As recently as the early 1980’s a group of 
neuropsychologists in Boston and Milan postulated that 
unique co-localization of cognitive functions within the 
right hemisphere might possibly lead to the development of 
anomalous functions. These speculations were not seriously 
considered until the larger compilations of literature and 
research were published in the late 1990’s including that 
original contribution by Beeman and Chiarello.2 Unfortu-
nately these subsequent approaches studied normal subjects 
for the most part. Also these studies ignored the fact that 
with the postulation of anomalous functions was also an Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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assumption (perhaps implicit), in the arguments that given 
base rates of true unambiguous lateralization these subjects 
would in all probability constitute a highly selective sample. 
With the exception of publication of a few contemporaneous 
empirical studies examining these hypotheses, the research 
field within this area was silent until a decade later.117
As the results of this review have shown it is hypothesized 
that the core anomalous functions that are hypothesized to 
result from an interaction of high IQ and strong right hemi-
sphere language dominance are exceptional human intuition 
and insight. Indeed just such cognitive functions or more 
appropriately “sociocognitive functions” have been postu-
lated to provide a solid empirical and theoretical bridging 
link between cognitive psychology and social psychological 
constructs.29 Incidentally the discovery of mirror neurons 
(which has been described as the most important discovery 
in neuroscience of 1990’s), is another bridging link that 
could ontogenetically speaking augment the development 
of exceptional intuitive and insightful cognitive functions in 
atypically localized subjects.274 As the review notes the origi-
nal conceptualization of intuition in Jungian terms may be 
poorly operationalized and it is now recognized that intuition 
and insight are currently badly conceived psychometrically 
and need better operationalizations and standardizations. The 
exception is that intuition may be closely associated with 
notions of expertise and Lieberman and colleagues have made 
excellent progress in elaborating the neurophysiological basis 
of these terms in cognitive neuroscience parlance.30
We note that because these two terms carry with them 
considerable connotations of “social intelligence” there is 
good reason to believe that exceptional achievement in sci-
entific, political and/or artistic domains might carry with it 
such selection effects. Two different types of problem-finding 
associated with insight are noteworthy in this sense. Pre-
sented problems are associated with normal Kuhnian science 
whereas revolutionary insight is associated with discovered 
problems of a fundamental paradigm changing, longer-term 
nature.37 Hence well-developed intuition and insight can only 
be demonstrated in a social context and there are ample case-
studies of eminent achievements that show that an abundance 
of intuition and insight constitute essential ingredients of 
such achievements. The selection hypothesis also raises the 
question of the essential ecology of the development of such 
unique social cognitive functions in humans. The cognitive 
science literature similarly points towards the importance 
of unconscious processes in intuition and more declarative 
conscious processes in insight. This substantial empirical 
research base alludes to some solid models of intuition and 
insight as well as theoretical development about how these 
two “cognitive processes” are interrelated.
For many social psychological, systems neuroscience 
and cognitive science reasons it is then shown that the core 
attribute of excellence in intuition consists of efficacy in, and 
well-developed repertoires of nonverbal decoding behavior. 
Secondly it is shown that there are also many neurophysi-
ological, behavioral, and gender difference reasons to suggest 
that women possess superior nonverbal decoding abilities 
on an average case-by-case basis as compared to most men. 
Particularly, caudate and orbitofrontal connectivity with the 
rest of the cortex seem to be able to explain a great deal of 
data pertaining to basal ganglia neurodegenerative studies and 
the cognitive neuroscience studies of category learning. It is 
hypothesized then the caudate may function as a critical way-
station between conscious declarative insight-based learning 
and nonconscious implicit intuitive schemas. Moreover it 
appears that as a skill becomes routinized the caudate-putamen 
and its cerebellar connectivity “usurps” control of formerly 
declarative knowledge schemas enabling: (i) automatization 
(ii) massively parallel processing and (iii) efficiency in the 
eventual coordination of multiple informationally-rich sche-
mas. It is then shown how intuition is primary to insight.
We then review how mood and emotion variables may 
be critically linked to the functioning of neural architectures 
for intuition and insight. Moreover, intrahemispheric sub-
cortical connectivity within anomalous subjects may figure 
prominently in the expression of these two sociocognitive 
phenotypes. In particular, a recently described inferior 
occipitofrontal fasciculus linking the orbitofrontal, ganglia 
and posterior cortical regions appears to have the necessary 
spatiotemporal properties to link intuitive and insight neural 
architectures.123,124 Next the neural correlates of intuition 
and insight are described. Intuition appears to be dependent 
on dual hemispheric inferior parietal and caudate structures 
whereas insight is dependent on right hemispheric temporal 
and right inferior prefrontal structures. Moreover several 
key functional neuroimaging studies show the right caudate 
acts as a way-station directing nonconscious activity along 
automatic default processing networks unless novel stimuli 
require frontotemporal evaluation of conscious signals. These 
signals are simultaneously monitored online for their affec-
tive salience in the orbitofrontal cortex. Also this caudate 
motor skill network is associated with judgments pertaining 
to “self in high-expertise domains” and thus seems to possess 
the necessary properties to be associated with ego functions. 
Finally the use of scripts by subjects in functional MRI and 
lesion studies illustrates the complex terminal end of the Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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ventral stream within the right orbitofrontal cortex. This 
ventral semantic stream seems to possess all the requisite 
neuropsychological properties to function as a fast conduit 
between posterior right inferior parietal nonverbal decoding 
networks and anterior right orbital highly specialized social-
context parsing neural networks (eg, script readers).
We then endeavor to show that crossed aphasia (eg, sub-
jects with significant right perisylvian lesions and aphasia 
implying strong premorbid right hemisphere language domi-
nance), was presumably the only means of finding such rare 
subjects until the first functional neuroimaging PET studies 
were published in the late 1980’s. It is then shown that recent 
comprehensive cataloguing of such patients contradicts “the 
crowding hypothesis”. The crowding hypothesis is tradition-
ally held as a truism among many clinical neuropsychologists 
and it suggests that with unusual atypical dominance often 
visuospatial functions are co-extensive with language. As a 
result of this unusual co-localization the crowding hypoth-
esis suggests that performance in both cognitive function 
domains is substandard to that of traditionally organized 
left hemisphere language dominant subjects. Also strong 
neuropsychological data converge on the common conclu-
sion that language is a much more distributed organization in 
the right hemisphere with perhaps better situational linkages 
between concepts represented in a much more distantly-
related manner. Next the relationship between hand praxis 
and atypical language localization is examined with some 
interesting attending hypotheses about sex-linked patterns 
of phenotypic expression.
Based on all the arguments and evidence discussed up until 
this point, the hypothesis is advanced that the resting state 
of the anomalous subject is biased towards fundamentally 
different computations that have been sometimes described 
as: global, coordinate, imagery, paradigmatic, simultaneous, 
parallel, holistic, and situational. Several strongly right hemi-
sphere dominant subjects identified through carotid Doppler 
studies were then compared in comprehensive neuropsycho-
logical studies with the understanding that this constitutes a 
small initial sample. Nonetheless in the context of various 
converging arguments and using diverse methodologies these 
tentative case study subjects are provocative. Most subjects 
showed little evidence of crowding with some evidence of 
disproportioned development of cognitive abilities. Typically 
IQ was lower than expected (given achievement indicators), 
in anomalous subjects and the pattern was reliable enough 
to suggest a trend. Interestingly most of these subjects were 
women which is congruent with some of the genetic hypoth-
eses previously advanced. It is then hypothesized (although 
by no means proven), that the reason that these women seem 
to be able to achieve beyond conventionally measured IQ is 
that they possess disproportionately well-developed intuitive 
and insight based acumen. Finally, a model of the interac-
tion of intuition and insight processes in clinical psychology 
is advanced with the goal of showing how important these 
sociocognitive functions are in the real-world.
In the final discussion all of the section’s main themes 
are reviewed integratively with the goal towards to advancing 
overarching hypotheses as well as testable empirical ques-
tions in subsequent studies. The focus is upon determining 
what these anomalous functions are in the most general 
sense, as well as why these sociocognitive functions may 
have evolved, and why they may be so specialized in these 
rare individuals? We review how the anomalous functions in 
question seem to have high correlations with both general IQ 
as well as spatial IQ suggestive of significant intermingling 
of gene pools. It is shown that high intuition and insight are 
highly correlated with performance in a host of occupations 
and that the putative maturation of a right ventral hemispheric 
“when pathway” is congruent with much recent work in 
cognitive neuroscience. It is speculated that one of the func-
tions of the development of this neural network would be 
to facilitate “inverse cognitive modeling” amounting to a 
neural mechanism for a much more articulate mapping of 
visual gestures. This would facilitate evolutionarily genetic 
dispersal as well as enable cross-linguistic fluency and hence 
facilitate cooperative behaviors across diverse genetic groups. 
Finally, the unique structure of this well-developed archetypal 
neural network might also enable highly accurate and precise 
lexicosemantic mapping of concepts to abstract features of 
transitive and intransitive human actions through massively 
parallel integration of information between cortical and 
subcortical structures.
Limitations
This lengthy review provides one of the first comprehensive 
neuropsychological overviews in the literature on “intuition” 
and “insight” as inter-dependent higher-order cognitive 
and social constructs. However a recent meta-analytic 
review of popular notions of “creativity” and hemispheric 
specialization271 may bridge some of the achievement-abil-
ity connections not discussed in depth in this article. It has 
been proposed that intuition and insight are: (1) individual 
difference variables with a normal distributions (2) are 
culturally universal constructs (3) are evolutionary advan-
tageous in terms of making social predictions and generat-
ing novel solutions to complex social problems (4) have a Psychology Research and Behavior Management 2010:3 
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hierarchical structure involving various components that 
are neuroanatomically localized (5) are predominately 
lateralized to the right hemisphere (6) are facilitated by 
co-localization with complimentary functions such as 
those involved in language processing (7) can account for 
elevated individual achievement in the context of average 
intellectual abilities, particularly in individuals with right 
hemisphere dominance for language. It is important to stress 
that the results of this review are not meant to naively imply 
that the left hemisphere and right hemisphere processing 
styles are absolute in nature.272 Instead for some highly 
selected individuals the left and right hemispheres may 
possess relatively greater specialization for certain types 
of spatiotemporal and semantic processes. The two sides of 
the brain do not operate independently or in isolation from 
the computations of the other hemisphere.188 As with any 
new foray into the arena of inquiry it is important to stress 
that this work is meant to facilitate subsequent research and 
especially further future well-designed empirical studies 
on the topic.
There is currently insufficient evidence showing how 
co-localization of cognitive functions within a hemisphere 
result in either (i) facilitation (as posited in this review) or 
(ii) interference effects in terms of performance exemplified 
by the concept of crowding. We have deliberately avoided 
discussions of crosscultural studies of intuition and insight 
lest this primarily neuropsychologically-orientated review 
become unmanageable. There is at present insufficient good 
measures of intuition and insight and these constructs are at 
present very poorly psychometrically conceived. We focused 
on a very small number of studies and in fact the only reason 
these cases were included was to highlight the usefulness 
of the systematic neuropsychological study of atypical 
subjects especially with the rise of advanced structural and 
functional neuroimaging methods. Also, the cases in ques-
tion used occupational attainment alone as an indicator of 
social ascendancy and socioeconomic status and included 
no measures of social competence, family connections, work 
ethos, and contemporary motivational constructs. Nor have 
the base rates of IQ distributions in various occupations 
been examined. The author has left it to future investigators 
to discover why if patent right hemisphere dominance is so 
potentially advantageous why is it also so universally rare? 
Finally, readers should be aware that even if the hypotheses 
of a right hemisphere language dominant specialization is 
not borne out by the data in those subjects with IQ’s in the 
normal range (eg, 100–120) this does not mean that this 
hypothesis does not apply to subjects above an IQ threshold 
or of high IQ. This “selection effect” caveat is due to the 
fact that right hemisphere dominant subjects: (i) constitute 
a highly selected sample to begin with; (ii) high IQ would 
allow for more synthetic processes to occur between build-
ing blocks of intuition and insight225 and (iii) the focus of 
this review is on abilities posited to allow for exceptional 
human performance currently at the upper bounds of our 
understanding of social cognition and human inter-group 
communication processes.
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